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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON BANKING AND FINANCIAL STABILITY
Sonali Sanghita Das, Ph.D.
Cornell University 2012
Financial crises have occurred repeatedly throughout history in both high
and middle-to-low income countries. This dissertation studies how the inter-
actions of financial market participants affect financial stability. In the first
part of the dissertation, I analyze sales of assets between financial institu-
tions in the United States and find evidence consistent with the theory that
credit-constraints affect the demand for, and price of, assets sold in fire-sales.
In the second part, I document the empirical regularity that the correlation
of banks’ stock return – a measure of the interconnectedness of banks – in-
creases in the run up to banking crises and thus helps predict crises. The
third part finds that the main measure of asset risk-exposure that banks re-
port to regulators are thought to be credible by equity investors, but less so
in countries where regulators have allowed banks more discretion over the
calculation of the measure.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Economists have long struggled with the question of how to structure finan-
cial systems to achieve an efficient allocation of resources and allow agents
to share risk. They key impediment lies in the fact that financial markets
are prone to panics that can be self-fulfilling and contagious, magnifying the
consequences of shocks that hit few institutions or markets. Over the last two
centuries, there has been only a single year in which no country was experi-
encing a financial crisis.1 This dissertation studies a component of financial
markets often overlooked in economics – how financial market participants
interact with each other – and its implications for financial stability.
In the second chapter, I analyze how the equity capital position of finan-
cial institutions affects their demand for assets and the resulting value of
1The year being 1823. According to Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2009) history of financial
crises for 69 countries, several countries have had a financial crisis (banking crisis, currency
crisis, and/or external debt crisis) in each year since 1800. The average number of countries
in crisis in each year of this period is 14.
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transactions between financial institutions. When intermediaries are credit-
constrained and have a sudden need for liquidity, they are forced to sell assets
to other institutions for cash. My results show a positive relationship between
buyer capital and the likelihood of buying assets, and between buyer capital
and the value of the deal. That is, those institutions that are the least con-
strained in their ability to raise funding are those that demand assets and pay
more for them. This result does not hold, however, for deposit-taking insti-
tutions that had access to several government programs designed to improve
their funding situation during the crisis of 2008.
The third chapter takes a broad view and documents a new empirical
regularity in the run up to banking crises. In a sample of 45 countries,
covering the period from 1993 to 2009, the correlation of banks’ stock returns
increases before the onset of a crisis. The increase in the correlation measure
is not driven by an overall increase in the national stock market – i.e. it does
not simply capture ‘boom’ periods – and there is no significant relationship
between the correlation of non-financial firms and crisis. Thus the stock
return correlation can be seen as a simple measure of interconnectedness
among banks that helps predict banking crises.
The fourth chapter, written jointly with Amadou N.R. Sy, focuses on
banks – regulated, deposit-taking institutions – and studies market percep-
tions of the riskiness of their risk-weighted assets (RWA) by examining the
determinants of the stock returns of an international panel of banks. Banks
are required to hold capital as a percentage of RWA and the rules used to
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calculate RWA have changed over time, allowing banks more discretion over
the calculation. We find a negative relationship between RWA and stock re-
turns over periods of financial crisis, suggesting that investors believe RWA
are an indication of bank portfolio risk. This relationship is weaker in coun-
tries that had implemented Basel II before the onset of the crisis, allowing
banks to use internal risk models to assess credit risks.
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Chapter 2
The Effect of Leverage on Asset
Sales between Financial
Institutions: Deal Level
Evidence
2.1 Introduction
In times of crisis, financial institutions are often forced to sell assets in order
to stay solvent. While this may be a necessary strategy for an individual
institution facing borrowing constraints, the action of selling under duress
can in fact drive down the price of assets and deepen the crisis. There is a
growing literature on these fire-sales of assets, and their role in deepening
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financial instability (Shleifer and Vishny 2011). Shleifer and Vishny (1992)
first formalized the idea of the ‘fire-sale’ pointing out that asset liquidation
often happens when the best users are (also) credit constrained, leading to a
lower liquidation value.
This paper provides new evidence on asset transactions between finan-
cial institutions. I first examine how the capital position of potential buyers
of assets affects both their decision to purchase and the value of transac-
tions themselves. There are two main features to recent theoretical contri-
butions that model fire-sales as an amplifying mechanism of liquidity crises
(Brunnermeier and Pederson (2009), Krishnamurthy (2010), and Fostel and
Geanakoplos (2008) in a multiple asset setting). First, the amount of funding
available to financial intermediaries is a function of their equity capital, up
to a maximum amount; and second, the demand for assets is a function of
the total funds available to intermediaries. These models focus on the con-
straints of the sellers and sales are assumed to be absorbed by agents who
have lower valuations of the assets. The ‘cash-in-the-market’ pricing models
of Allen and Gale (1998, 2005) explicitly model the buyers, however, and
show that an asset’s sale price will be determined by the limited amount of
cash, or liquidity, held by the surviving financial intermediaries, since they
are the marginal buyers. I find that the capital to assets ratio of financial
institutions is positively related to both their decision to purchase assets and
to the value of the transaction.
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Second, I analyze whether there are sectoral1 differences in how buyer
capital affects the demand for assets and the deal value. Based on their re-
lationships before the subprime crisis, and government policies implemented
during the crisis, different types of financial institutions have had varying
degrees of access to funding over the past few years. He, Khang, and Kr-
ishnamurthy (2010) carefully measure how securitized assets shifted across
sectors in the United States during the 2008 crisis. They find that the hedge
fund and broker-dealer sectors, sectors that rely on repo financing, reduced
asset holdings and the commercial banking sector, which had access to more
stable funding sources, increased asset holdings. Their evidence suggests that
certain groups of financial institutions can step in to ease liquidity problems
during financial crises, but also that government liquidity policies imple-
mented to encourage commercial banks to lend to the real sector may have
unintended effects. By disaggregating to the institution level in this paper,
I am able to shed light on the extent to which credit constraints affect asset
demand and price across institutions that are similarly affected by policy.2
I focus on the potential buyers of assets, as opposed to the sellers, for two
reasons. First, distressed financial institutions sell assets for reasons that are
fairly well understood. When in need of liquidity, they have three options:
1By ‘sectoral’ I mean sub-sectors within the financial sector. Broadly: deposit-taking
institutions (commercial and savings banks), investment banks, broker-dealers, hedge-
funds, and real estate and insurance companies.
2He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) study securitized assets while I study assets
such as property and actual loan portfolios held by financial institutions. More detail is
provided in the data description in section 2.3.
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raise equity capital, raise debt, or sell assets for cash. Raising equity capital
is thought to be costly due to debt overhang (Myers 1977) or adverse selec-
tion problems facing the potential equity investors (Myers and Majluf 1984)
even in good times, so it is likely to be especially difficult or costly in times
of financial distress. Acharya, Gujral, and Shin (2009) find that financial
intermediaries did raise new capital in 2008, both from private investors and
from government-funded capital injections, but it was predominantly in the
form of hybrid claims such as preferred equity and subordinated debt. That
is, claims that are debt-like and cannot be thought of as equity capital. Sec-
ond, the information on sellers of assets in the database used is less detailed
and complete than that on the buyers, making an analysis of the sellers’
balance-sheets difficult.3 The next section describes differences in access to
funding across financial sectors, sections 2.3 and 2.4 describe the data used
in the analysis and the estimation strategy, sections 2.5 and 2.6 present the
results and robustness checks, and section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Access to funding within the financial sector
Funding composition differs across different types of financial institutions.
The first distinction, in all periods and not just during crises, is that com-
mercial and savings banks raise (partially) insured deposits, which are con-
sidered to be a relatively stable and cheap form of borrowing. Runs on banks
3For example, when a real-estate property is being sold the database often lists the
name of the selling company as simply the address of the property being sold. Identifying
information for the buyers is properly recorded, however.
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by depositors have been relatively rare in the United States since the creation
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 1934.4 Addition-
ally, coverage limits – the amount per depositor that is insured by the FDIC
– were increased from $100,000 to $250,000 in 2008. A second policy af-
fecting commercial banks was the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program
(TLGP), in place from October of 2008 to December of 2010. It allowed
deposit-taking institutions to issue senior unsecured debt with a maximum
three year term, with the FDIC insuring default on these bonds for a fee of
25 to 50 basis points. Finally, the Fed cut the discount rate for commercial
banks several times beginning in August 2007.
The Fed also allowed investments banks to begin borrowing directly from
the discount window in March of 2008, using a broad range of debt securities
as collateral. Hedge funds and broker-dealers, on the other hand, did not
have access to government support and traditionally raise debt mostly in the
form of repo financing. These differences in funding sources suggest that
deposit-taking institutions had greater access to, or a lower cost of, funding,
followed by investment banks, and then hedge-funds and broker-dealers.
4Prior to the crisis of 2008, some academic economists declared depositor bank runs to
be dead after the implementation of deposit insurance, while others pointed to the runs
that took place in emerging market economies in which there was deposit insurance in
place. This crisis saw a resurgence of bank runs – first with Northern Rock in the UK and
then BearStearns and IndyMac in the United States, in September 2007, March 2008, and
July of 2008.
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2.3 Data
The main dataset used in the analysis is the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum
M&A database, which contains data on mergers and acquisitions of firms, as
well as on sales of assets. The assets traded are primarily real estate portfolios
(apartment buildings, office buildings, etc.), loan portfolios, bank branches or
units of financial institutions, and there are a few observations on other assets
such as equity investment portfolios, asset-backed securities, and IT systems.
The type of asset is not given by data providers, unfortunately, so these were
coded from a text description of the deal where possible.5 I analyze deals
between financial institutions located in the United States between 2005 and
2011, where the buyer is a publicly-traded company. Approximately 85% of
the assets sold by US institutions to other financial institutions in this time
period are to other US institutions.6
To estimate a model that controls for sample selection bias arising from
the possibility that a firm’s characteristics affects its decision to buy assets, I
first start with the universe of publicly-traded financial firms in United States
that are contained in the Worldscope/Datastream database. Financial firms
are those with a Standard Industrial Classification code beginning with the
5The description of the deal was searched for strings such as: “home loan portfolio”;
“real estate portfolio”, “acquired” and “bank” and “branches”; “asset backed securities”,
etc. covering all the possible types.
6Another 6% are sold to Australian and Canadian firms, and the remaining deals are
made with the following 13 countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Japan,
Mexico, Netherlands, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United Arab
Emirates.
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digit 6 (division H). The focus on publicly-traded firms is driven primarily
by data constraints, as the Worldscope database only contains balance-sheet
data for public firms. The sample of potential buyers consists of 1116 financial
firms. This sample of potential buyers is then merged to the deals with
publicly-traded buyers in the deals database. The resulting sample is of 402
deals, representing 402 ‘sellers’ and 183 unique buyers.
2.4 Modeling the determinants of asset transaction val-
ues
The main hypothesis being tested in this paper is that there is a positive
relationship between the capital to assets ratio of the buyer, and the value of
an asset sale.7 There are two reasons to expect this. First, an institution’s
cash is counted in its capital measure, so firms with higher capital may sim-
ply have higher cash on hand with which to purchase assets and may have
a higher willingness to pay for assets. Second, since capital ratios are often
seen as a measure of health for financial institutions, those with more capital
should be able to borrow on better terms. The leverage constraint theories
of Brunnemeier and Pederson (2009) and Fostel and Geanokoplos take the
maximum debt financing available to an intermediary to be proportional to
its equity capital. A second hypothesis concerns the intensity of the relation-
ship between firm capital and deal value. As leverage constraints are more
7By which I mean the price at which the asset is sold. I use the term ‘deal value’ instead
of ‘price’ simply to make clear that the units of the assets being sold are not standardized.
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important for non-deposit taking institutions, we expect the positive rela-
tionship between buyer capital and deal value to be greater for non-deposit
taking institutions.
To test these hypotheses, I use a Heckman selection model (Heckman
1979) to estimate the effect of buyer capital on the value of an asset sale.
Under the assumption that any unobservable characteristics that affect a
financial firm’s decision to buy assets are uncorrelated with unobservable
characteristics that affect the value of the deal itself, ordinary least squares
would produce unbiased estimates of the effect of buyer capital on the value
of an asset sale. This is too strong an assumption to make, however, as one
can imagine the preferences of a manager inclined to expand during crisis
times to affect his approach to bargaining on price. In addition, the effect of
a buyer’s characteristics on its propensity to purchase an asset is interesting
in itself.
Let i=seller, j=buyer, and Ejt = 1 if institution j buys an asset in year
t. The first stage selection equation is a Probit estimation of the probability
that a buyer purchases an asset in a given year of the sample.
Pr(Ejt = 1) = F (δ1(capitaljt/Ajt)+δ2 logAjt+δ3Agrowthjt+δ4 logmrkttobookjt+vt)
(2.1)
where the buyer’s capital to assets ratio, capitaljt/Ajt, and size, given by
the log of assets, are variables of interest in both the selection equation
and the main equation. Two other buyer characteristics, asset growth and
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the log of the market-to-book ratio, are included to identify the selection
equation. Agrowthjt is the buyer’s percentage increase in total assets over
the previous year and mrkttobookjt is the market value of a firm’s assets
divided by the book value of its assets.8 The first variable captures whether
the firm has been expanding and the second the firm’s potential to grow.
Year dummies are included to control for macroeconomic shocks that affect
all financial institutions alike. The expected signs of the coefficients are
δ1 > 0, δ2 > 0, δ3 > 0, and δ4 > 0. That is, institutions with more capital,
larger institutions, institutions that have been expanding, and institutions
with a higher Tobin’s q, are expected to be more likely to purchase assets.
The estimated coefficients from equation 2.1 are used to calculate the
inverse Mills ratio, φ(δ)/Φ(δ), which is then included in the main equation
to correct for potential sample selection bias. The equation estimating the
determinants of the value of asset sales is:
log yijs = β1(capitaljt/Ajt)+β2 logAjt+θ1Xij+θ2MarketRs+λ(φ(δ)/Φ(δ)jt)+uijt
(2.2)
The dependent variable log yijs is the log of the value of a transaction
between seller i and buyer j that takes place on day s of year t, in millions of
US dollars. The selection equation 2.1 is estimated using a buyer-year panel,
while equation 2.2 is estimated on a pooled sample of deals with selection bias
correction at the buyer-year level. The main explanatory variable of interest
8Calculated as (market value of equity + book value of liabilities)/book value of assets.
This is standard practice in the corporate finance literature.
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is the capital ratio, and the hypothesis is that β1 > 0. We also expect β2 > 0
as larger firms are likely to buy larger assets. The control variables included
in Xij are indicator variables that denote whether the seller and buyer are in
the same US city, the same US state, and the same sector. MarketRs is the
stock market return over the month prior to the day the deal is announced,
included to control for macroeconomic shocks.
Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics corresponding to both the full
sample of equation 2.1 and the deal (censored) observations. We see that
institutions that buy assets have a high capital ratio on average, at 71 percent,
compared to 31 percent for all firms. The firms that buy assets are also larger.
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Deal value, millions of US dollars 350.75 1551.44
Buyer capital/assets 31.28 26.52 71.02 31.11
Buyer assets, millions of US dollars 20,600 145,000 67,700 295,000
Asset growth (%), previous year 10.63 22.63 17.49 27.12
Buyer market to book 0.56 1.52 1.08 0.73
US stock market return, previous month 0.54 4.61
Same city 0.04 0.20
Same state 0.28 0.45
Same sub-sector 0.27 0.02
Uncensored (5823 obs) Censored/deal (402 obs)
2.5 Results
I find evidence in support of the hypothesis that the value of a deal is in-
creasing in the buyer’s capital ratio. Table 2.2 presents the estimation of
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equation 2.2 using OLS (not including the sample selection correction term),
for the sake of comparison with the Heckman selection model.
Table 2.2: Determinants of value of asset sale – OLS
Dependant variable: log(Value of asset sale)
(1)
log(deal value)
Buyer capital/assets 0.016***
(0.003)
Buyer log(assets) 0.578***
(0.037)
Same city 0.223
(0.354)
Same state 0.187
(0.154)
Same sub-sector 0.888***
(0.204)
US stock market return 0.004
(0.014)
Observations 402
Adj R-squared 0.390
This table presents the estimation of the deal value equation using OLS. The
dependent variable is the log of the value of the transaction, in millions of US
dollars. The explanatory variables are the buyer’s total capital to assets ratio,
the buyer’s size given by the log of total assets, indicator variables for whether
the seller and buyer are based in the same city, same state, and whether they
belong to the same sub-sector, and the US stock market return over the month
prior to the day the deal is announced. Standard errors are in parentheses below
the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent confidence levels, respectively.
The coefficient on the capital ratio is the estimated semi-elasticity of the
deal value with respect to the capital ratio. The estimate of 0.016 indicates
that a 1 percentage point increase in the capital ratio is associated with a 1.6
percent increase in deal value. The coefficient on the size variable indicates
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that a 1 percent increase in the size (assets) of the buyer is associated with
a 0.6 percent increase in the deal value, on average. Whether the seller and
buyer are located in the same US city or state seem not to affect the value of
the deal, but deals between firms in the same financial sector have a higher
value, with the coefficient of 0.888 indicating they are priced higher by 2.43
million US dollars on average.
Table 2.3 shows the benchmark estimation results of the Heckman selec-
tion model. The estimated coefficients in column (1) show that the capital
ratio, size, and asset growth of the buyer are positively related to its propen-
sity to buy assets. The marginal effects are as follows: a 1 percentage point
increase in the capital ratio (from the mean) increases the probability of a
deal by 0.8 percent, a 1 percent increase in size increases the probability of a
deal by 0.05 percent, and a 1 percentage point increase asset growth increases
the probability of a deal by 0.06 percent.
The positive coefficient lambda in column (2) indicates that unobservables
in equations 2.1 and 2.2 are positively correlated.9 That is, unobserved char-
acteristics that increase a financial institution’s likelihood of buying assets
also increase the value of the deal. This coefficient is statistically significant
at the 5 percent level, indicating that there is indeed a sample selection effect
and OLS is not an appropriate method to estimate equation 2.2. Once we
correct for the selection bias, the effect of capital on deal value is higher: 3.2
9The correlation between the error terms is in fact ρ where ρ = λ/σ and σ is the
variance of the error term in equation 2.2, uijt.
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Table 2.3: Determinants of deal probability and deal value
Heckman selection model
(1) (2)
probability(deal) log(deal value)
Buyer capital/assets 0.026*** 0.032***
(0.002) (0.008)
Buyer log(assets) 0.178*** 0.695***
(0.014) (0.062)
Same city 0.157
(0.351)
Same state 0.180
(0.152)
Same sub-sector 0.872***
(0.199)
US stock market return 0.007
(0.014)
lambda 0.778**
(0.337)
Buyer asset growth 0.002*
(0.001)
Buyer log(market to book) -0.032
(0.057)
Observations 5823 402
This table presents the results of estimating the Heckman selection model. Column
(1) shows the selection equation. The explanatory variables are the buyer’s total
capital to assets ratio, the buyer’s size given by the log of total assets, the US stock
market return over the month prior to the day the deal is announced, the buyer’s
growth in assets in the year prior to the deal, and the log of the buyer’s market
value of assets to book value of assets. Column (2) shows the deal value equation.
The explanatory variables are the buyer’s total capital to assets ratio, the buyer’s
size, indicator variables for whether the seller and buyer are based in the same
city, state, whether they belong to the same sub-sector, the selection correction
terms, and year dummies (not shown).
percent for a 1 percentage point increase in capital/assets compared to the
1.6 percent for the OLS results in Table 2.2.
Next, I group the sample (buyers) into deposit-taking institutions and
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‘non-deposit-taking’ institutions, and include interaction terms for the non-
deposit-taking institutions in the estimation. Table 2.4 shows the results. We
see that it is the non-deposit-taking institutions that account for the positive
relationship between buyer capital and both the likelihood of buying assets
and the deal value. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the capital
position of deposit-taking institutions should not affect their asset purchases
as much as other institutions, as the deposit-taking ones had better access
to or cheaper funding during the crisis.
The next specification digs further into the differences between different
financial sub-sectors. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 provide further descriptive statis-
tics on the types of financial institutions. Table 2.7 shows the estimation
results including interaction effects for each group of non-deposit-taking in-
stitutions: investment banks and other credit institutions, hedge funds and
broker-dealers, and insurance and real estate. The results show no relation-
ship between capital, the likelihood of making a purchase, and the deal value
for deposit-taking institutions. There is a significant and positive relation-
ship between capital and the probability of making a purchase for each other
type of potential buyer, however. Column (2) shows no relationship between
capital and deal value for each group, and no significant differences across
sectors.
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Table 2.4: Determinants of deal probability and deal value – Deposit-taking
institutions versus other financial institutions
Heckman selection model
(1) (2)
probability(deal) log(deal value)
Buyer capital/assets -0.014* -0.005
(0.008) (0.014)
  Buyer capital/assets * non-deposit taking 0.042*** 0.033***
(0.009) (0.011)
Buyer log(assets) 0.198*** 0.718***
(0.028) (0.062)
  Buyer log(assets) * non-deposit taking 0.004 -0.001
(0.004) (0.003)
Same city 0.153
(0.347)
Same state 0.205
(0.151)
Same sub-sector 0.884***
(0.197)
US stock market return 0.006
(0.014)
lambda 0.840**
(0.331)
Buyer asset growth -0.002
(0.003)
Buyer log(market to book) 0.345*
(0.177)
Observations 5823 402
This table presents the results of estimating the Heckman selection model, in-
cluding an interaction term for financial institutions that do not raise deposits
(indicated by ‘* non-deposit taking’). The other explanatory variables are as in
Table 2.3.
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Table 2.5: Number of transactions between financial sectors
Buyers
Sellers Deposit inst Inv bank & oth HF & BD Ins & real est   Total
Depositary institutions 51 2 1 0 54
Inv bank & other credit 10 18 6 0 34
Hedge fund & broker-dealers 4 9 15 0 28
Insurance & real estate 2 3 255 26 286
  Total 67 32 277 26 402
This table shows the number of deals that took place between each financial
sector included in the deal sample.
Table 2.6: Buyer capital by financial sector
obs Mean Std Dev obs Mean Std Dev
Depositary institutions 4017 18.17 8.74 67 18.22 8.44
Inv bank & other credit 494 63.42 29.12 32 48.33 29.94
Hedge fund & broker-dealers 445 85.04 14.68 277 88.54 10.98
Insurance & real estate 851 45.86 26.32 26 48.35 28.74
Uncensored (5823 obs) Censored/deal (402 obs)
This table shows the average capital to assets ratios of each financial sector,
for the whole sample of potential buyers and also for the sample of buyers that
purchased assets.
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Table 2.7: Determinants of deal probability and deal value – sectoral decom-
position
Heckman selection model
(1) (2)
probability(deal) log(deal value)
Buyer capital/assets -0.009 0.001
(0.007) (0.018)
  Buyer capital/assets * Inv bank & other credit 0.016** -0.004
(0.007) (0.019)
  Buyer capital/assets * Hedge fund & broker-dealers 0.040*** 0.008
(0.007) (0.021)
  Buyer capital/assets * Insurance & real estate 0.023*** 0.015
(0.007) (0.019)
Buyer log(assets) 0.167*** 0.516***
(0.022) (0.067)
  Buyer log(assets) * Inv bank & other credit 0.019 0.138***
(0.024) (0.053)
  Buyer log(assets) * Hedge fund & broker-dealers 0.005 0.221***
(0.032) (0.062)
  Buyer log(assets) * Insurance & real estate -0.066*** 0.093
(0.022) (0.069)
Same city 0.213
(0.347)
Same state 0.160
(0.152)
Same sub-sector 0.743**
(0.302)
US stock market return 0.007
(0.014)
lambda 0.329
(0.356)
Buyer asset growth 0.001
(0.001)
Buyer log(market to book) -0.163***
(0.063)
Observations 5823 402
This table presents the results of estimating the Heckman selection model, includ-
ing interaction terms for the financial sub-sector of the buyer. Indicator variables
for the sub-sector of both the seller and buyer are included as well (not shown)
and the category left out is deposit-taking banks. Other explanatory variables are
as in Table 2.3.
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2.6 Robustness
I perform two robustness exercises in this section. First, I estimate the
selection model using the subset of deals for which the type of assets (e.g.
building versus loan portfolio) was coded and control for the asset type, to
ensure the results are not driven by a relationship between buyer capital and
the class of assets purchased. In these 252 deals, 88 percent are properties,
7 percent are loan portfolios, and 5 percent are units or branches of banks.
The results are shown in Table 2.8.
The coefficient on the buyer’s capital ratio and the other explanatory
variables are very close to the benchmark estimation. The dummy variables
for asset type indicate that loan portfolios sell for 2.24 million more than
properties, on average.
Finally, Table 2.9 shows the results of estimating equation 2.2 on the full
sample of transactions involving US sellers – those bought by US firms as
well as the other 15 countries listed in the data section.10 The estimated co-
efficients are close to the estimates from the original OLS estimation shown
in Table 2.2. The increase in value when a deal occurs between two firms in
the same sector is now smaller, however, by about 1 million US dollars. In
column (2), I include an interaction term for buyers that are from countries
10I do not estimate a selection model here because (1) identifying the universe of po-
tential buyers is less straightforward than for the United States and (2), even having done
so, the number of ‘zeros’ (non-purchases) in the selection equation would be problematic
for the estimation. Just around 15 percent of sales from US firms had foreign buyers.
A potentially fruitful future project would be to study deals between a broader set of
countries.
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Table 2.8: Determinants of deal value – controlling for type of asset
Heckman selection model
(1) (2)
probability(deal) log(deal value)
Buyer capital/assets 0.036*** 0.066***
(0.002) (0.015)
Buyer log(assets) 0.199*** 0.767***
(0.019) (0.091)
Same city -0.141
(0.395)
Same state 0.456***
(0.170)
Same sub-sector 0.993***
(0.346)
US stock market return -0.005
(0.016)
Asset type: loan portfolio 0.810*
(0.442)
Asset type: bank branch/unit 0.572
(0.642)
lambda 1.193***
(0.426)
Buyer asset growth 0.002
(0.002)
Buyer log(market to book) -0.127*
(0.074)
Observations 5673 252
This table shows the results of estimating the two-stage model on a subsample
of data for which the type of asset – be it real estate property, a loan portfolio,
or a unit or branch of a bank – was coded. The category ‘property assets’ is left
out, while indicators for ‘loan portfolio’ and ‘bank branch/unit’ are included. The
variables are described in Table 2.3.
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that were in financial crisis starting in 2007 or 2008, according to the clas-
sification by Laeven and Valencia (2008). This includes the United States.
There does not appear to be a different effect of capital on deal value for
countries in crisis. The positive effect of buyer size on deal value is larger
when the buyer is from a crisis country, however.
Table 2.9: Determinants of deal value – US sales to buyers in all countries
OLS
(1) (2)
Buyer country in crisis -1.956*
(1.016)
Buyer capital/assets 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.003) (0.003)
  Buyer capital/assets * buyer country crisis -0.007
(0.006)
Buyer log(assets) 0.563*** 0.528***
(0.039) (0.042)
  Buyer log(assets) * buyer country crisis 0.328***
(0.083)
Same city 0.062 0.128
(0.291) (0.284)
Same sub-sector 0.447** 0.443**
(0.194) (0.190)
(Buyer - US) stock market return 0.028 0.037
(0.072) (0.073)
Observations 591 591
Adj R squared 0.361 0.377
This table presents the estimation of the deal value equation using OLS, including
institutions in all countries that purchased an asset from the United States. buyer
country crisis’ is an indicator variable for whether the buyer’s country is in a
financial crisis, starting in 2007/2008, according to the Laeven and Valencia (2008)
classification. (Buyer – US) stock return is the difference the in the stock market
return of the buying institutions’ country and the US return. The other variables
are as in Table 2.3.
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2.7 Summary and conclusion
I study asset transactions between financial firms in the United States and
find that greater capital, or lower leverage, increases the probability that a
potential buyer will purchase an asset and also increases the value of the
deal that takes place. This does not hold for deposit-taking institutions,
however, who had greater access to or cheaper funding during the financial
crisis. These results are consistent with theories that posit that demand for
assets is a function of funding availability, and show that credit-constraints
of financial intermediaries can interact to reduce asset prices and deepen
liquidity crises. It would be interesting to see whether these results hold for
assets transaction in other countries, where government policies providing
support to the financial sector differed.
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Chapter 3
Interconnections in Banking,
Systemic Risk, and Crisis
3.1 Introduction
The recent global financial crisis has prompted a renewed interest in the fac-
tors that lead to fragility in the financial sector. Waves of panics or failures of
banks have been common throughout history in both high and middle-to-low
income countries (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009) and, despite an increase in the
number of government policy interventions designed to stabilize the banking
system, recent decades have not seen a decrease in the frequency of bank-
ing crises (Calomiris 2009). In addition to being a recurring phenomenon,
banking crises are costly for the economies involved, through their role in
triggering or deepening recessions and increasing the debt of governments
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who engage in bank bailouts.1
Recent policy discussions on preventing future banking crises focus on
banks that are too big, or too interconnected, to fail. The idea being that
the failure of large or interconnected banks has serious negative effects for
non-financial sectors or contagion risks to other banks. The data on banks’
exposures needed to measure interconnectedness may be reported in part to
national banking regulators in some countries, but is not currently publicly
available. This paper proposes a novel market-based measure of banking sec-
tor interconnectedness which can be calculated for a large group of countries
– the correlation of banks’ stock returns – and asks whether interconnected
banking sectors are more likely to end up in crisis.
The theory on individual bank fragility is well established, traditionally
focusing on the maturity mismatch between bank liabilities and assets. The
creation of long-term assets from short-term deposits leaves banks susceptible
to panic-based runs on their liabilities (Bryant 1980, Diamond and Dybvig
1983). A number of extensions of the Diamond-Dybvig model relate bank
runs to sunspots, and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) link the probability
of a bank run to a signal about the overall state of the economy. Models
that incorporate spillovers between banks, which lead a failure to, in fact,
become a crisis, have been put forth more recently. Chen (1999) extends
1Considering 42 of the systemic banking crises that occurred between 1970 and 2007,
Laeven and Valencia (2008) calculate an average fiscal cost associated with crisis manage-
ment of 13.3% of GDP, and output losses (measured as deviations from trend) averaging
about 20% of GDP during the first four years of crisis.
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Diamond-Dybvig to a set up with multiple banks and interim revelation of
information about the performance of some banks. With depositors who
update according to Bayes rule, a sufficient number of interim bank failures
results in pessimistic expectations about the general state of the economy
and leads to runs on the remaining banks. In practice, multiple bank failures
are likely to be a more precise signal to depositors about the health of the
banking industry than economy-wide activity. In the model of Acharya and
Yorulmazer (2008), depositors have information on the extent to which banks
lend to the same risk-type of borrowers (borrowers who will invest in the same
industries, for example). The information spillover from one bank failure then
shows up in increased borrowing rates for remaining banks and potentially
also in bank failures (if the increased rates are high enough).
I use the correlation of banks’ stock returns as a proxy for interconnect-
edness to study the relationship between interconnectedness and banking
system stability. De Nicolo` and Kwast (2001) and Billio, Getmansky, Lo,
and Pelizzon (2010) also use stock returns, or indexes of stock returns, to
measure linkages between financial institutions. Observing that bond prices
reflect individual default risk while credit default swap contracts also reflect
counterparty risk, Giglio (2010) uses the information content of bond and
credit default swap prices for 15 large US and European financial institu-
tions to create bounds on the probability of joint failures. My measure of
interconnectedness can be calculated from data that is readily available for
banks in a large number of countries, which makes it ideal for a cross-country
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comparison of banking sector distress. First, I estimate a binary Logit prob-
ability model to see whether banking crises, as classified by Laeven and
Valencia (2008, 2010) are more likely in interconnected banking sectors. Af-
ter performing the benchmark estimation, I use an instrumental variables
estimation procedure to ensure the results are not driven by endogeneity of
banks’ stock return correlation. Second, I estimate the relationship between
interconnectedness and the number of bank failures in times of crisis, which
is indicative of its severity, using an ordered Logit model. Boyd, De Nicoloo`,
and Loukoianova (2009) suggest that since banking crisis indicators are con-
structed in large part using information on government actions undertaken
in response to bank distress, they do not accurately measure the start of a
banking crisis but instead capture a variety of government policy responses
that occur after the onset of crisis. Third, in light of these concerns about
the accuracy of the crisis indicators used in the previous empirical literature,
I also consider the number of bank failures that occur in each year, whether
a crisis period or not. I estimate the probability of bank failures in all years,
distinguishing between large banks and small banks, to see whether the re-
lationship between interconnectedness holds in all periods and similarly for
large and small banks.
For a sample of 45 countries from 1993 to 2009, I find that both the
probability of a banking crisis and the probability of a greater number of
large bank failures during times of crisis is increasing in banking sector in-
terconnectedness. I also find that the probability of large bank failures is
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higher for more connected banking sectors in all years. No significant rela-
tionship between the interconnectedness of small banks and the probability
of small bank failures is found. The paper proceeds as follows: section 3.2
reviews the related literature, section 3.3 describes the measure of intercon-
nectedness, section 3.4 describes the data and empirical method, section 3.5
discusses the results, section 3.6 includes robustness tests, and section 3.7
concludes.
3.2 Related literature
3.2.1 Literature on banking crises
The first empirical studies of banking crises found that the probability of
crisis was higher in countries with a weak prior macroeconomic environment
and a weak institutional environment.2 The literature then expanded into
empirical studies of two types: (i) studies of how the economic structure of a
banking sector affects its likelihood of having a crisis and (ii) an early-warning
systems literature whose goal is to predict the onset of crises. The main find-
ings from the first set of studies are that the probability of banking crisis
is decreasing in the concentration or competitiveness of a banking system
(Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Levine 2006; Schaeck, Cihak, and Wolfe 2009,
2Specifically, the factors that have been found to be positively related to the likeli-
hood of crisis are: low real GDP growth, high inflation, high real interest rates, financial
liberalization, lending books, asset price declines, weak law and order, weak accounting
standards, and weak legal enforcement. See Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (1997, 1998),
Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1999), and Hutchison and McDill (1999).
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among others) and, while most cross-country differences in banking regula-
tion and supervision do not have significant effects, the stringency of official
capital requirements decreases the probability of banking crises (Barth et al
2004).3 Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) find that the existence of an
explicit deposit insurance scheme increases a country’s probability of having
a banking crisis. The authors suggest that the positive relationship may be
the result of a moral hazard effect of deposit insurance, whereby deposit-
taking institutions with limited liability increase their risk-taking. The early
warning systems literature is growing (see Frankel and Saravelos (2010) and
chapter 3 of the IMF’s September 2011 Global Financial Stability Report).
Rose and Spiegel (2009), however, estimate a multiple-indicator multiple-
cause model for 107 countries to examine sixty-five potential causes of the
2008 crisis and find few factors that are robustly linked to the incidence of
crises across countries. They warn that this bodes poorly for early warnings
models, which would have to predict the timing of crises out-of-sample in
3Policy studies of the overall economic effect of increasing banks’ capital requirements
have recently been conducted by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
and economists at the Bank of Canada and the Bank of Japan. Expecting a negative
relationship between capital adequacy and the likelihood of a banking crisis, these papers
estimate probability of crisis models to help quantify the expected benefit of higher capital
requirements. Perhaps as a result of having a very specific goal in mind, these studies each
focus on a small group of countries and use few explanatory variables in their Logit or
Probit probability of crisis estimations. As expected, they find that a higher capital ratio
in the banking sector reduces the probability of a banking crisis. Specifically, the Bank of
Canada report (August 2010) finds that an increase of 2 percentage points in the aggregate
capital to assets ratio decrease the probability of a banking crises by between 0.8 and 2.6
percentage points. The BCBS/FSB Long Term Economic Impact report found that an
increase of 2 percentage points in bank capital ratios reduced the probability of a financial
crisis by 2.9 percentage points.
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addition to successfully predicting crises in the cross-section.
Instead of relying on the standard events-based indicators of banking
crises,4 Von Hagen and Ho (2007) develop an index of money market pressure
and identify banking crises as periods in which there is excessive demand for
liquidity in the money market. Defining crisis episodes in this way, they
find evidence for macroeconomic factors that precede banking crises that
are consistent with prior studies.5 In addition, several papers study the
interplay between banking crises and currency crises or sovereign debt crises
(Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Glick and Hutchinson (2000), Reinhart and
Rogoff (2011)).
3.2.2 Measuring systemic risk
Systemic risk is the risk of joint defaults in the financial system. That is, the
risk of a banking crisis occurring. De Bandt and Hartmann (2000) provide
precise definitions of systemic risk and crises.6 Banking crises result from
4Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (2002, 2005), Caprio et al. (2005), Reinhart and
Rogoff (2008b), and Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2010). These banking crisis indicators
build on the classification first compiled by Caprio and Klingebiel (1996, 1999).
5That is, that a slowdown of real GDP, lower real interest rates, extremely high infla-
tion, large fiscal deficits, and over-valued exchange rates tend to precede banking crises in
47 countries from 1980 to 1996.
6A narrow systemic event is one in which the release of bad news about a financial
institution, or its failure, leads in a sequential fashion to considerable adverse effects on
one or several other financial institutions. That is, a case where a failure of one bank
due to an idiosyncratic shock spreads to another bank or several other banks. A broad
systemic event includes not only the events described above but also simultaneous adverse
effects on a large number of institutions or markets as a consequence of a severe and
widespread (systematic) shock. Next, a systemic event is categorized as strong if the
institution(s) affected in the second round or later actually fail as a consequence of the
initial shock, although they were solvent ex ante. Putting these together, their definition
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two types of events: (1) an idiosyncratic shock that causes one financial
institution to fail, with this failure spreading to other institutions, or (2) a
systematic shock that affects multiple financial institutions causing a joint
default. Most crises will in fact lie in between these two extreme types but,
for a given set of external shocks, banking systems in which banks are more
connected, whether through similar distributions of claims on non-financial
firms or significant claims on each other, will be more likely to end up in
crisis. A more interconnected banking system may have a more severe crisis
in response to a systematic shock. In practice, the onset of banking crises are
dated based on a combination of: (i) observing a large number of defaults
in a particular country, (ii) large changes in the aggregate balance-sheet of
the banking sector that indicate distress,7 and (iii) some judgment about the
seriousness of the events. When identifying banking crises, of course, it is
difficult to differentiate between crises that result from the propagation of an
idiosyncratic shock versus crises that are due to systematic shocks.
Recent work on systemic risk focuses on measuring the individual contri-
butions to systemic risk of particular financial institutions. Acharya, Ped-
ersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010) measure a financial institution’s
contribution to systemic risk (the systemic expected shortfall) as its propen-
sity to be undercapitalized when the system as a whole is undercapitalized.
of a systemic crisis is a “systemic event (narrow or broad) that affects a considerable
number of financial institutions or markets in a strong sense, thereby severely impairing
the general well-functioning of the financial system.”
7For example, an exhaustion of aggregate banking system capital, or sharp increases
in non-performing loans.
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The CoVaR measure of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) captures the Value-
at-Risk of financial institutions conditional on other institutions being in
distress. These analyses aim to measure contributions to systemic risk by
conditioning on manifestations of systemic risk – that is, on financial crises
– with the goal of improving the regulation and supervision of individual
banks, which is currently based on individual risk measures. The goal of this
paper is to use variation in the interconnectedness of banking sectors across
countries to determine if greater interconnectedness in the sector increases
the probability that a crisis will occur.
An analysis of systemic risk in the Unites States that is closest in spirit to
my measure of interconnectedness is that of Billio, Getmansky, Lo, and Peliz-
zon (2010). They calculate Granger causality networks among the returns of
indexes of the one-hundred largest banks, brokers, hedge funds, and insur-
ance companies in the United States for five different sub-periods: 1994-1996,
1996-1998, 1999-2001, 2002-2004, and 2006-2008. They find that connections
increase before financial crises (the crisis triggered by the collapse of Long
Term Capital Management in 1998, and the subprime crisis) and during
crises. Observing that bond prices reflect individual default risk while credit
default swap contracts also reflect counterparty risk, Giglio (2010) uses the
information content of bond and credit default swap prices for 15 large US
and European financial institutions to create bounds on the probability of
joint failures. My measure of interconnectedness can be calculated from data
that is readily available for banks in a large number of countries, which makes
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it ideal for a cross-country comparison of banking sector distress and allows
it to shed light on the relationship between interconnectedness before a crisis
and the manifestation of crises.
3.3 Measure of interconnectedness
To measure interconnectedness in the banking sector, I calculate the correla-
tion of the quarterly stock returns of the largest ten banks in each country,
over the previous 3 years. That is, I calculate the rolling three-year (12 quar-
ter) correlation between each pair of banks and take the simple average.8 In
the absence of data on the returns on banks’ loan and securities portfolios,
the correlation of stock returns serves as a proxy for the correlation of their
portfolio returns. There is a positive relationship between the accounting
return on assets (net income divided by assets) of banks and stock returns in
all but one country in the sample. Market returns reflect information more
rapidly than measures based on accounting variables and the frequency of
stock price data allows us to measure the correlation more precisely than
could be done using information from annual accounting data.
Two prior studies have used stock returns to measure interconnections
between banks. As previously mentioned, Billio et. al. (2010) use the cor-
relations of returns of indexes of US financial institutions to measure the
linkages component of systemic risk9 and, in a study of whether the consoli-
8The results are robust to using the correlation of the returns of the largest five banks,
by assets, and also to using five-year (20 quarter) rolling windows instead.
9Their framework is meant to cover the“four L’s” of systemic risk: liquidity, leverage,
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dation of financial firms in the United States throughout the 1990s increased
systemic risk, De Nicolo` and Kwast (2001) use the correlation of the stock
returns of large and complex banks as a measure of their interdependencies.
Figure 3.1 shows the correlation measure calculated for the largest 5 non-
financial firms in the United States, and Figure 3.3 of the appendix shows the
correlation measure calculated for the largest 5 firms in several different sec-
tors in the United States. There is no comparable increase in the correlation
measure prior to the crisis for the non-financial sectors.
Figure 3.1: Interconnectedness of largest 5 banks and interconnectedness of
largest 5 non-financial firms in the US
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Table 3.1 shows the number of banking crises in the sample and the time
in crisis as the correlation measures increases. There is a positive relation-
ship between crises and the correlation measure: in the lowest tertile of the
correlation measure, 6.6% of the sample is in a banking crisis, while in the
highest tertile it increases to 22% in crisis.
Table 3.1: Number of banking crises and time in crisis by interconnectedness
Tertile 1 Tertile 2 Tertile 3
Mean 0.072 0.590 0.904
Crisis Years (%) 6.57 9.90 21.97
No. Crises 3 3 17
Correlation of Bank Stock Returns (top 10)
Chi-squared: 16.4***
Chi-squared: 18.8***
I also split the sample into the largest and smallest banks in each country
and calculate the measures of interconnectedness using the correlation of the
stock returns of the largest 5 banks and of the smallest 5 publicly-traded
banks, respectively. Figure 3.2 shows the interconnectedness of large banks
and of small banks in the United States over time. The interconnectedness
of both the largest banks and smallest banks increased in the years prior to
the subprime crises, but the increase was steadier for the largest 5 banks.
Several potential problems with the measure of interconnectedness must
be addressed. First, do changes in the stock return correlation simply reflect
changes in the overall stock market? In order to ensure this is not the case, I
scale the stock price of each bank by the price of a national market index for
the country in which the bank is located and calculate correlations using the
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Figure 3.2: Interconnectedness of large banks and interconnectedness of small
banks in the US
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stock returns based on these relative prices.10 Second, do cross-country dif-
ferences in the stock return correlation reflect national factors that determine
stock prices? The estimation strategy described in the next section includes
country factors and the instrumental variables estimation in the robustness
section shows that the main results are not driven by simultaneity.
10I also control for market returns and volatility in the robustness section.
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3.4 Data and empirical method
3.4.1 Probability of a banking crisis
To study the relationship between banking sector interconnectedness and the
probability of a crisis, I conduct a panel estimation using a Logit probability
model. In the benchmark specification, an indicator variable equal to one
when country i is in a banking crisis in year t is regressed on the variable of
interest – the measure of interconnectedness – and control variables Z, both
lagged by one year, country fixed factors αi and year effects vt:
Pr(Yit = 1) = Λ(αi + βInterconnectednessi,t−1 + Zi,t−1γ1 + vt) (3.1)
where Λ(βX) = exp(βX)/ exp(1 + βX) is the logistic function. A positive
and significant estimate of β indicates that banking sectors that are more
interconnected are more likely to end up in crisis. I use the dates of banking
crises provided by Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2010), discussed further in
section 3.4.4, to create the banking crisis indicator.11 Using this method,
twenty-three crises occur between 1993 and 2009 in the 45 country sample.
Table 3.11 of the appendix lists the countries and banking crises in the sam-
ple. Interconnectednessi,t−1 is the 12 quarter (three-year) rolling correlation
of the quarterly stock returns of country i’s largest ten banks discussed in
11The majority of the previous literature on the probability of banking crises is based
on these indicators of banking crises. Von Hagen and Ho (2007) is an exception.
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the previous section.12
Turning to the control variables, as in prior studies of banking crises, real
GDP growth is included to capture macroeconomic developments that may
affect the quality of bank’s assets. A time-variant dummy variable equal to
one in the presence of an explicit deposit insurance policy and the Ilzetzki,
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) classification of the exchange rate regime, which
is increasing in flexibility, are also included as controls. The share of financial
sector assets that is foreign is included to control for the banks’ susceptibility
to foreign shocks, and the log of per capita GDP in US dollars is a proxy
for differences in the institutional environments of each country. Country
fixed-effects are included in all specifications, to control for any inter-country
variation that is constant over the sample period. For example, one would
expect variation in the strength of banking regulation and supervision across
countries to affect the probability of banking crises.13 Time dummies are
included in all specifications, to capture time-dependent shocks to the world
economy. All of the explanatory variables are lagged by one year to minimize
concerns about possible simultaneity. In addition, as in the previous litera-
ture, I keep only the first year of a banking crisis and the years in which there
12The results are very similar using the three-year rolling correlations of the top five
banks, by assets, as well as the five-year rolling correlations of the top 10 banks or top 5
banks.
13Barth, et al (2004), however, create indexes of various components of banking regu-
lations and supervision for a cross-section of countries in 1999, and find they have little
significance in explaining banking crises after including country indexes of the quality of
institutions in the analysis. Also, since regulation varies little over time and, specifically,
because the indexes are time-invariant, it is not possible to include both the indexes of
regulation and country fixed effects in the estimation.
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was no crisis in my sample to minimize concerns about possible endogeneity
between the explanatory variables and the occurrence of crises. That is, the
subsequent years of each banking crises are not included in the estimation.14
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity following Huber (1967)
and White (1980), generalized to allow for correlation within countries.
3.4.2 Probability of n bank failures during a crisis
Next, I identify the number of banks that failed during each crisis and esti-
mate the relationship between interconnectedness and the number of bank
failures using an ordered Logit model. Systemic risk is defined as the risk of
joint failures, but the banking crisis indicators used in the literature use a
variety of data to determine whether a banking crisis has occurred. Even af-
ter the establishment of deposit insurance funds to protect depositors in the
case of failures, many governments have continued to rescue distressed banks
precisely due to concerns about contagion. The number of bank failures is
an indication of the severity of a banking crisis, although the importance
of the particular banks that failed must of course be taken into account. I
distinguish between the number of large and small bank failures, where large
14The discrepancies across different classifications of crises are greater for the end dates
than the starting dates. For example, for only the start year of the crisis, the discrepancy
between the Laeven and Valencia classification and that of Reinhart and Rogoff is equal
to 1.7 percent of common country-years, but when considering all crisis country-years, the
discrepancy is 7 percent. So for robustness, I also drop years two and three of each banking
crises, instead of each year until the end given in the Laeven and Valencia classification,
following Dell’ Ariccia, Detragiache, and Ragan (2008) who take the length of banking
crises to be three years, and Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al. (2006) who find that GDP growth
returns to its pre-crisis level in the fourth year of a crisis.
CHAPTER 3. INTERCONNECTIONS AND CRISIS 41
banks are those that have assets greater than the median bank in the sec-
tor. Ordered Logit models can be derived from an underlying latent variable
model just as in the case of binary dependent variables.15 We assume that
the latent variable y∗ is determined by
y∗it = βInterconnectednessi,t−1 + Zi,t−1γ1 + vt + it (3.2)
where it ∼ Λ(βInterconnectednessi,t−1 + Zi,t−1γ1). The dependent vari-
able is now the number of bank failures in country i in year t. Instead of
considering each possible integer value of the number of bank failures, I let
y = 3 when there are three or more bank failures. This reduces the number
of threshold parameters to be estimated and does not affect the remaining
parameter estimates which are used to interpret the partial effects of the
explanatory variables. The explanatory variables are as in the binary Logit
model of the previous section.
15Let X = (Interconnectedness, Z) and θ = (β, γ1) and define threshold parameters
(α1, α2, α3) such that: y = 0 if y∗ ≤ α1, y = 1 if α1 < y∗ ≤ α2, y = 2 if α2 < y∗ ≤ α3, and
y = 3 if y∗ > α3. Then the probabilities of one, two, or three failures are given by:
Pr(y = 0|X) = Λ(α1 −Xθ)
Pr(y = 1|X) = Λ(α2 −Xθ)− Λ(α1 −Xθ)
Pr(y = 2|X) = Λ(α3 −Xθ)− Λ(α2 −Xθ)
Pr(y = 3|X) = 1− Λ(α3 −Xθ)
and the parameters (α1, α2, α3, θ) can be estimated by maximum likelihood.
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3.4.3 Bank failures and share of failed assets in all
years - large versus small banks
Regulators take different approaches to the rescue or resolution of large banks
and small banks and the business models of the two groups vary. The liter-
atures on banking crises and systemic risk are primarily concerned with the
failure of large financial institutions, as these failures are likely to have the
most severe effects – both in terms of contagion to other banks and on other
sectors of the economy. The failures of even small banks can have detrimen-
tal effects on non-financial economic activity, however. Ashcraft (2003) finds
that the failure of relatively small US banks in 1998 and 1992 permanently
reduced local real county income by 3 percent, through a decline in bank
lending.
In order to examine whether interconnectedness has the same effect on
the failure of both large and small banks, I divide each country into two
regions: the “large” banking sector and the “small” banking sector. The
large banking sector is categorized in one of two ways. It includes (i) all
banks that are larger than the median bank in each country-year, by assets,
or (ii) all banks that have assets greater than 10 billion US dollars.16 The
small banking sector for each country-year consists of the remaining banks.
16I present the results using the median classification first, and results using the banks
larger and smaller than 10 billion US dollars second. Initial considerations of systemically
important financial institutions (SIFIs) defined them to be institutions with assets greater
than 50 billion US dollars. These are primarily focused on banks in wealthier countries in
Europe and the United States. I use a threshold of 10 billion US dollars to include large
institutions in emerging markets.
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This leaves us with a country-sector-year panel.
I then estimate the probability of a bank failure occurring in each country-
sector-year using a Logit model, similar to before, except I include a (i)
dummy variable for the large sector, (ii) the interaction between intercon-
nectedness and the large sector, and (iii) the share of banking system assets
in each country-sector-year observation to control for the relative sizes of the
large and small sectors. The model is:
y∗ijt = α + β1Interconnectednessi,t−1 + β2Dj + β3(Interconnectednessi,t−1 ×Dj)
+ β4Shareijt + Zi,t−1γ1 + vt + ijt (3.3)
In this specification the dependent variable is (i) an indicator variable equal
to one if there was a bank failure in sector j of country i in year t and (ii)
the share of assets of the failed banks in sector j of country i in year t.
A positive and significant β1 indicates that interconnectedness among small
banks increases the probability of small bank failures and a positive and
significant β3 indicates that interconnectedness among large banks increases
the probability of large bank failures.
3.4.4 Data
I assemble an international panel of 45 high and middle income countries,
over the period from 1993 to 2009. The dataset has four main components:
the indicators of banking crises from Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2010), bank
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histories from the Bankscope database to determine bank failures, bank stock
price data from Datastream to calculate the measure of banking system in-
terconnectedness, and the control variables.
The most up-to-date classifications of banking crises are provided by
Laeven and Valencia, henceforth LV, and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), hence-
forth RR. In this paper, I use the classification of LV as they study a smaller
set of countries and appear to have more precise dates.17 See Table 1 of Boyd,
De Nicolo´, and Loukoianova (2009) for a comparison of four classifications
of banking crises, including LV and RR. LV define a systemic banking crisis
as a situation in which a country’s corporate and financial sectors experi-
ence a large number of defaults and financial institutions and corporations
face great difficulties repaying contracts on time. Using this broad definition
of crisis, and combining quantitative data with some subjective assessment
of the situation, they identify the starting year of systemic banking crises
around the world since 1970. They define the end of a crisis as the year
before two conditions hold: real GDP growth and real credit growth are pos-
itive for at least two consecutive years. In case there is growth in real GDP
and real credit in the first two years of a crisis, the crisis is dated to end in
the same year that it starts.
Information on bank failures in the United States is from the FDIC’s
Historical Statistics on Banking. Bank failures in other countries are identi-
17For example, LV dates the banking crisis in Japan from 1997 to 2001 while RR dates
it from 1992 to 2000, RR do not count the 1988 US savings and loan crisis whereas LV
do, and a few mistakes were noted in the dates RR compiled from other sources.
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fied from the Bankscope dataset, which contains paragraph long histories of
banks. Specifically, in the case of banks that have left the Bankscope dataset,
the history identifies the year in which the bank has become inactive and a
short description of the circumstances. I count banks that have been listed as
bankrupt, liquidated, or had their banking licenses revoked as failed banks.
In times of financial distress, mergers are often encouraged or forced by na-
tional authorities. The data does not allow me to distinguish between these
“bad” mergers and voluntary mergers, so I do not count banks that have
ceased to exist due to mergers as failed banks. The number of bank failures
thus identified can be seen as an underestimate of distress in the banking
sector. This is a contribution to the data on financial crises, as reliable data
on bank failures does not exist for many countries. Tables 3.12 and 3.13 of
the appendix show the number of bank failures, both large and small, and
their mean size for each country in the sample.
The data on real GDP growth comes from the World Bank’s World Devel-
opment indicators and information on deposit insurance schemes comes from
the World Bank’s Deposit Insurance around the World dataset, which con-
tains federal deposit insurance policies and characteristics for a large sample
of countries since its inception in the United States in 1933.18 The classifica-
tion of exchange rate regimes is the fine classification from Ilzetzki, Reinhart
18The dataset ends in 2003, so I update the key variable, an indicator for whether there
is an explicit deposit insurance scheme in place in a given country in a given year to the
present and correct a mistake in the database regarding the years during which Argentina
has had explicit deposit insurance. Almost all explicit deposit insurance schemes are
mandatory, requiring all banks that collect time or savings deposits to join.
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and Rogoff (2008). To maximize sample size, I use an unbalanced panel
in which some country-year observations are missing. I exclude, however,
countries for which there are less than six subsequent years of data available.
Constraints on the availability of stock price data leave us with a sample of
45 countries, in which 23 banking crises took place, from 1993 to 2010, after
excluding 1 percent of outliers on either tail of the distributions. Table 3.2
provides descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables.
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics
Obs Mean StdDev Min Max
Interconnectedness - top 10 678 0.50 0.23 -0.51 0.99
Interconnectedness - top 5 678 0.57 0.25 -0.67 0.99
Interconnectedness - bottom 5 500 0.46 0.27 -0.65 0.98
RealGDPgrowth 720 3.54 3.43 -10.89 18.29
Deposit Insurance 720 0.79 0.40 0 1
ExchangeRateRegime 716 7.57 4.32 1 15
ForeignAssets/Assets 720 17.63 16.13 0.27 74.53
Concentration (top 3 banks) 670 63.53 18.95 20.09 96.40
Share maj government owned 572 21.44 25.21 0 81
Market index quarterly return 516 4.69 16.24 -66.89 92.51
Market index volatility 488 11.29 7.90 0.32 51.92
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Probability of a banking crisis
The results of the benchmark estimation support the hypothesis that higher
interconnectedness increases the probability of a banking crisis occurring.
The measure of interconnectedness, the return correlation of the largest ten
banks, has a positive and significant effect on the probability of crisis (see
Table 3.3). The average marginal effect corresponding to the coefficient of
3.71 indicates that a 1 percent increase in the return correlation increases
the probability of a crisis by 5.8 percentage points. This is a large effect
and greater in magnitude than the effect of real GDP growth by 2 percent-
age points. Consistent with the previous literature, prior real GDP growth
decreases the probability of crisis and the coefficients on the deposit insur-
ance and exchange rate regime variables are negative, as expected, but not
significant.
3.5.2 Probability of n bank failures during a crisis
While the probability of a banking crisis is increasing in the correlation mea-
sure, the results of the estimation of the probability of the number of bank
failures indicate that higher correlation does not necessarily predict more
bank failures, when all bank failures are counted. The estimated coefficient
of interconnectedness on the probability of n bank failures, where n is 1, 2,
or more than 3, is not significant when all bank failures are counted. When
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Table 3.3: Determinants of banking crises – benchmark results
Dependent variable: Banking Crisis Indicator
Logit Coefficient Coefficient eF/eX
(1) (2) (2)
Interconnectedness (t-1) 3.709** 1.686
(1.516)
RealGDPgrowth (t-1) -0.351* -0.341* -1.267
(0.200) (0.183)
Deposit Insurance (t-1) -2.708 -2.649 -1.978
(1.797) (1.969)
Exchange Rate Regime  (t-1) -0.136 -0.143 -1.028
(0.143) (0.155)
No. obs 612 612
Pseudo-R2 0.51 0.52
No. crises correctly predicted 18/23 19/23
% crises + % non-crises correct 137.7 149.0
The table presents panel regressions for 45 countries over the 1993–2009 period.
The dependent variable is the banking crisis indicator, a discrete variable equal to
1 if there is a banking crisis in year t and zero otherwise. The independent variables
are the rolling correlation of the largest 10 banks’ quarterly stock returns, from year
t-1 to t-4, real GDP growth, an indicator variable for the presence of an explicit
deposit insurance scheme, the classification of the exchange rate regime, which is
increasing in flexibility, the share of financial sector foreign assets (insignificant),
and the log of per capita GDP in US dollars (insignificant), all lagged by one year.
Country fixed effects and year effects are included. Standard errors (in parentheses
below the coefficient estimates) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity following Huber
(1967) and White (1980), generalized to allow for correlation within countries.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent confidence levels,
respectively.
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restricting consideration to only large bank failures, however, the probability
of the number of failures is increasing in interconnectedness. A one percent
increase in the correlation results in a 1.4 percentage point increase in the
probability of two large bank failures, and a 1.1 percentage point increase in
the probability that three or more banks will fail (see Table 3.4).
When counting only the number of small banks failures, I find no sig-
nificant relationship between interconnectedness and the number of failures.
This could be because a larger share of the deposits of small banks will be
insured deposits, making them less susceptible to failure through runs on
deposits. Bologna (2011) finds indications that banks in the United States
with a higher share of deposits above the level covered by deposit insurance19
had a higher probability of failure between 2007 and 2009.
19That is, the share of deposits with denominations greater than $100,000. The FDIC
insured deposits up to the amount of $100,000 at the start of the sample, although this
was increased to $250,000 in 2008.
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3.5.3 Bank failures and share of failed assets in all
years - large versus small banks
To further study the relationship between interconnectedness and bank fail-
ures in all years, we turn now to the country-sector-year panel, where the
sector denotes either the large banks in a country’s banking sector or the
smaller banks. We again see a different effect of interconnectedness on large
banks and on small banks. The estimated relationship between intercon-
nectedness and the probability of large bank failures (table 3.5) is consistent
with the results on banking crises. A one percent increase in the correlation
measure is associated with an approximately 5 percentage point increase in
the probability of large bank failures. The coefficient on the dummy vari-
able for the large sector shows that the probability of failure of large banks
is lower, by 7 percentage points when classifying large banks as those with
assets greater than 10 billion US dollars.
Finally, corresponding to the bank failures in Table 3.5, Table 3.6 shows
the results of the estimation of model 3.3 with the share of assets of failed
banks to all banks as the dependent variable. These results are, as they
should be, consistent with the results of the probabilities of failures pre-
sented in Table 3.5. Higher interconnectedness of large banks is associated
with a higher share of failed assets, 0.63 percentage points higher for a one
percent increase in correlation in the median classification. For the small
banking sector, however, the estimated coefficient on interconnectedness is
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again negative but not significant. Interconnectedness has no significant ef-
fect on the probability of small bank failures, or the share of assets made up
of small banks that fail.
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3.6 Robustness
3.6.1 Instrumental variables estimation
The results of the previous section indicate that the probability of a banking
crisis, and similarly of the failure of large banks, is increasing in the level of
interconnectedness of the banks prior to crisis. In order to ensure the results
are not driven by increasing correlation in times of crises, or by factors that
increase both the correlation of banks’ stock returns and the probability of
crises, I conduct instrumental variables estimation. The instrument for the
banks’ stock return correlation is the ratio of the value of total shares traded
on the national stock market to real market capitalization. Although stock
market capitalization is known to fall during most banking crises, there is
no clear relationship expected between crises and the total value of shares
traded. While the value of certain stocks may fall, turnover may increase.
At the same time, increased turnover is likely to have a positive effect on
the return correlation. Panel B of Table 3.7 shows the first stage regression,
where the t-test that the instrument is not related to interconnectedness can
be rejected at a 5% level of confidence. Panel A shows the second stage
results. The 2SLS result corresponds to a linear probability model, with
the standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity, and the second stage
Logit coefficient is consistent with the benchmark results. Both show that
an increase in interconnectedness increases the probability of a banking crisis.
CHAPTER 3. INTERCONNECTIONS AND CRISIS 56
Table 3.7: Determinants of banking crises – IV estimation
Panel A: Probability of Crisis
Dependent variable: Banking Crisis Indicator 
(1) (2)
2SLS 2nd-stage logit
Interconnectedness (t-1) 1.518** 37.958*
(0.741) (22.024)
RealGDPgrowth (t-1) 0.008 -0.863
(0.009) (1.374)
No. obs 572 572
R2 0.22
Pseudo-R2 0.78
Panel B: First Stage Estimation
Dependent variable: Interconnectedness
StockMarketValueTraded
No. obs
F-stat
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
(0.021)
0.57
20.25
572
(1)
0.053**
The table presents instrumental variables estimation results for 45 countries over
the 1993–2009 period. Panel B present the first stage estimation, where the de-
pendent variable is the rolling correlation of banks’ quarterly stock returns and
the instrument is the total value of shares traded in the stock market for country i.
Panel A presents the second stage estimations, using both 2SLS (corresponding to
a linear probability model) and a Logit probability model. The dependent variable
is a discrete variable equal to 1 if there are bank failure(s) in country i in the large
or small section of the financial sector j in year t. The independent variables are
the (instrumented) rolling correlation of banks’ quarterly stock returns from year
t-1 to t-4, real GDP growth, an indicator variable for the presence of an explicit
deposit insurance scheme, the classification of the exchange rate regime, which is
increasing in flexibility, the share of financial sector foreign assets (insignificant),
and the log of per capita GDP in US dollars (insignificant), all lagged by one
year. Country fixed effects and year effects are included. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively.
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3.6.2 Additional controls
To check for the possibility that the observed relationship between banking
crises and interconnectedness is driven by stock market movements that affect
the stock return correlation, I next control for the return on a national stock
market index, as well as the volatility of the index. The positive effect of
interconnectedness on the probability of banking crisis is robust to these
inclusions (Table 3.8).
Past studies have found mixed results concerning the effect of competition
on banking crises. I find concentration, measured as the share of assets held
by the three largest banks, to have no significant effect on the probability of
banking crises (Table 3.9). Karolyi and Taboada (2010) calculate the share of
banks that is majority owned by the government for 1995, 2000, and 2005. In
a reduced sample20 with these three years, I check whether the share of banks
that are majority government owned decreases the probability of crises, as
would be expected. I find no significant effect of government ownership on
the probability of crisis.
20The sample is reduced as the share of government ownership is calculated only for
1995, 2000, and 2005.
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Table 3.8: Determinants of banking crises – overall stock market movements
Dependent variable: Banking Crisis Indicator
Logit
(1) (2)
Interconnectedness (t-1) 5.258** 8.410**
(2.306) (4.194)
Market index return (t-1) -0.008
(0.023)
Market index volatility (t-1) 0.076
(0.074)
RealGDPgrowth (t-1) -0.427* -0.950***
(0.219) (0.315)
Deposit Insurance (t-1)
Foreign asset share (t-1) 0.034 0.254***
(0.065) (0.091)
No. obs 488 465
Pseudo-R2 0.57 0.71
No. crises correctly predicted 14/20 12/20
% crises + % non-crises correct 155.2 179.5
The table presents panel regressions for 45 countries over the 1995–2009 period.
The dependent variable is the banking crisis indicator, a discrete variable that
equals one if there is a banking crisis in year t and zero otherwise. The independent
variables are the rolling correlation of the largest 10 banks’ stock returns, from t-
1 to t-4, the return on a national market index in the last quarter of the prior
year, the rolling standard deviation of the market quarterly returns, from t-1 to
t-4, real GDP growth, an indicator variable for the presence of an explicit deposit
insurance scheme, the classification of the exchange rate regime, which is increasing
in flexibility, the share of financial sector foreign assets (insignificant), and the log
of per capita GDP in US dollars (insignificant), all lagged by one year. Country
fixed effects and year effects are included. ***, **, and * indicate significance at
the 1, 5, and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively.
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Table 3.9: Determinants of banking crises – concentration and government
ownership of banks
Dependent variable: Banking Crisis Indicator
Logit
(1) (2)
Interconnectedness (t-1) 4.633*** 4.378*
(1.662) (2.493)
Concentration (t-1) -0.019
(0.038)
Share of Government 0.024
Owned Banks (t-1) (0.022)
RealGDPgrowth (t-1) -0.365** -0.482
(0.186) (0.339)
No. obs 609 119
Pseudo-R2 0.55 0.18
No. crises correctly predicted 19/23 0/3
% crises + % non-crises correct 149.0 100.0
The table presents panel regressions for 45 countries over the 1993–2009 period in
column (1) and for 1993, 2000, and 2005 in column (2). The dependent variable is
the banking crisis indicator, a discrete variable that equals one if there is a banking
crisis in year t and zero otherwise. The independent variables are the rolling
correlation of the largest 10 banks’ stock returns, from t-1 to t-4, the concentration
of the banking sector (measured as the share of assets in the largest three banks),
the share of banks that are majority government owned from Karolyi and Taboada
(2010), real GDP growth, an indicator variable for the presence of an explicit
deposit insurance scheme, the classification of the exchange rate regime, which is
increasing in flexibility, the share of financial sector foreign assets (insignificant),
and the log of per capita GDP in US dollars (insignificant), all lagged by one
year. Country fixed effects and year effects are included. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively.
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Following Allen, et al. (2002), several measures of balance-sheet risk
exposure were investigated but not found to have a significant effect on the
probability of banking crises. They lay out a framework for understanding
crises based on the examination of stock variables in the aggregate balance-
sheet of a country and the balance-sheets of its main sectors. Four types
of balance-sheet mismatches help to determine a country’s ability to service
debt in the face of shocks: (i) maturity mismatches, where a gap between
liabilities due in the short term and liquid assets leaves a sector unable to
honor its contractual commitments if the market declines to roll over debt,21
or creates exposure to the risk that interest rates will rise; (ii) currency
mismatches, where a change in the exchange rate leads to a capital loss;
(iii) capital structure problems, where a heavy reliance on debt rather than
equity financing leaves a firm or bank less able to weather revenue shocks; and
(iv)solvency problems, where assets are insufficient to cover liabilities. They
note that maturity mismatches, currency mismatches, and a poor capital
structure can all contribute to solvency risk, but solvency risk can also arise
from simply borrowing too much or from investing in low-yielding assets.
The currency composition of bank’s assets and liabilities is unfortunately
not available in the Worldscope database, so currency mismatches cannot be
measured. The specific measures used to address the other three risks men-
21The classic model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) shows how this maturity mismatch
makes banks susceptible to panic-based runs by depositors. The idea, of course, extends
to other debtors of banks. Gorton (2009) illustrates how the recent financial crisis started
as a run in repurchase markets (short term, or overnight, lending between financial firms).
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tioned above are created as follows. First, the aggregate maturity mismatch
is the ratio of the total short-term and current portion of long-term debt in
the banking sector to the total value of liquid assets. The current portion
of long-term debt is that which is due within a year, and liquid assets are
composed of cash and investments in government securities. Exposure to risk
is increasing in this measure. Second, capital structure problems are mea-
sured simply as the ratio of total capital to total assets. Exposure to risk is
decreasing in this measure as capital is widely the main buffer between banks
and failure, and capital adequacy is the key target of banking supervisors and
regulators. Estrella et al (2000) find that capital ratios are a good predictor
of bank failure in the United States from 1998 to 1992 and that, somewhat
surprisingly, a risk-weighted ratio does not consistently outperform the sim-
pler ratios, particularly with short horizons. Third, solvency risk exposure
is calculated as the net worth (assets plus capital minus liabilities) of the
banking sector, scaled by assets.
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Table 3.10: Determinants of banking crises – balance-sheet risk exposures
Dependent variable: Banking Crisis Indicator
Logit
(1) (2) (3)
Interconnectedness (t-1) 4.597** 4.643** 4.679**
(1.962) (2.097) (1.974)
MaturityMismatch (t-1) 0.008
(0.008)
Capital/Assets (t-1) -0.172
(0.108) -0.087
NetWorth/Assets (t-1) (0.106)
-0.641*** -0.358** -0.709***
RealGDPgrowth (t-1) (0.196) (0.150) (0.246)
No. obs 570 534 571
Pseudo-R2 0.60 0.55 0.60
% crises + % non-crises correct 155.9 162.3 156.1
The table presents panel regressions for 43 countries over the 1994–2009 period.
The dependent variable is the banking crisis indicator, a discrete variable that
equals one if there is a banking crisis in year t and zero otherwise. The independent
variables are the rolling correlation of the largest 10 banks’ stock returns, from t-1
to t-4, the asset-weighted mean ratio of short-term and current portion of long-
term debt to liquid assets at public banks, the asset-weighted mean capital to assets
ratios of public banks, the asset-weighted mean ratio of the net worth to assets of
public banks, real GDP growth, an indicator variable for the presence of an explicit
deposit insurance scheme, the classification of the exchange rate regime, which is
increasing in flexibility, the share of financial sector foreign assets (insignificant),
and the log of per capita GDP in US dollars (insignificant), all lagged by one
year. Country fixed effects and year effects are included. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively.
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3.7 Conclusion
I study the effect of interconnectedness among banks within a banking sec-
tor on banking system stability and find that (i) the probability of a banking
crisis is increasing in interconnectedness, (ii) the probability of a greater
number of large bank failures during crisis periods is increasing in intercon-
nectedness, and (iii) the probability of one or more large bank failures is
higher when banks are more interconnected, in all years. I interpret these
results as indicative of contagion within banking sectors. When banks are
more connected, the failure of one bank has adverse affect on other banks,
resulting in subsequent bank failures. Interestingly, I find no significant rela-
tionship between the interconnectedness of smaller banks and the probability
of small bank failures. This could be due to the fact that a larger share of the
deposits of small banks are insured, making them less susceptible to failure
through runs on deposits.
This paper adds to the growing literature that suggests that banking
regulators could gain from incorporating stock price information into their
assessments of bank risk. The focus of the paper is on linkages within banking
sectors and the potential for contagion within a country. Future research on
the transmission mechanisms through which financial crises spillover to other
countries would be valuable.
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3.8 Appendix
Figure 3.3: Interconnectedness of largest 5 firms by sector – United States
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Table 3.11: Banking crises 1993-2009
Emerging and developing economies
Country Crisis years Non-crisis countries
Argentina 2001-2003 Bangladesh Pakistan
Brazil 1994-1998 Chile Peru
Colombia 1998-2000 China South Africa
Ecuador 1998-2002 Egypt SriLanka
Malaysia 1997-1999 Kenya Venezuela
Philippines 1997-2001 Lebanon
Thailand 1997-2000 Mexico
Turkey 2000-2001 Morocco
Advanced Economies
Country Crisis years Non-crisis countries
Austria 2008- Australia
Belgium 2008- Canada
Denmark 2008- Finland
France 2008- Hong Kong
Germany 2008- Israel
Greece 2008- Italy
Ireland 2008- Norway
Japan 1997-2001 Poland
Korea (South) 1997-1998 Singapore
Netherlands 2008-
Spain 2008-
Sweden 2008-
Switzerland 2008-
United Kingdom 2007-
United States 2007-
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Table 3.12: Bank failures by country and size – median classification
Country Small banks Large banks
Number Mean size Number Mean size
(millions US$) (millions US$)
Argentina 27 27 390 0
Australia 10 1 280 3 5,403
Austria 9 7 195 2 30,489
Bangladesh 0 0 0
Belgium 15 15 313 0
Brazil 21 12 53 9 1,042
Canada 9 9 102 0
Chile 0 0 0
China 0 0 0
Colombia 16 14 167 2 2,734
Denmark 3 0 3 517
Ecuador 3 2 64 1 863
Egypt 0 0 0
Finland 0 0 0
France 38 32 183 6 2,824
Germany 31 14 129 17 1,054
Greece 0 0 0
HongKong 10 10 612 0
India 0 0 0
Ireland 9 3 2,093 1 11,608
Israel 3 1 65 0
Italy 14 14 136 0
Japan 14 5 1,434 9 22,253
Kenya 4 4 37 0
Korea 12 0 12 2,954
Malaysia 3 2 206 1 30,044
Mexico 3 2 241 1 3,466
Morocco 0 0 0
Netherlands 10 10 925 0
Norway 1 0 1 3,270
Pakistan 1 1 28 0
Peru 5 4 90 1 279
Philippines 1 1 331 0
Poland 2 2 227 0
Singapore 7 0 0
SouthAfrica 13 11 309 2 2,429
Spain 4 4 504 0
SriLanka 0 0 0
Sweden 1 1 3 0
Switzerland 33 28 138 5 15,566
Thailand 3 0 3 1,832
Turkey 2 2 1,052 0
UK 37 20 320 17 9,805
USA 288 175 85 126 29,954
Venezuela 1 0 1 1,128
Total failures
Large banks are those with assets greater than the median bank in each country-
year.
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Table 3.13: Bank failures by country and size – 10B US$ classification
Country Small banks Large banks
Number Mean size No. Mean size
(millions US$)
Argentina 27 27 390 0
Australia 10 9 1,369 1 13,787
Austria 9 7 195 2 30,489
Bangladesh 0 0 0
Belgium 15 15 313 0
Brazil 21 21 477 0
Canada 9 9 102 0
Chile 0 0 0
China 0 0 0
Colombia 16 16 488 0
Denmark 3 3 517 0
Ecuador 3 3 330 0
Egypt 0 0 0
Finland 0 0 0
France 38 37 308 1 11,410
Germany 31 31 636 0
Greece 0 0 0
HongKong 10 10 612 0
India 0 0 0
Ireland 9 8 1,592 1 11,608
Israel 3 3 1,023 0
Italy 14 14 136 0
Japan 14 8 2,896 6 30,714
Kenya 4 4 37 0
Korea 12 12 2,954 0
Malaysia 3 2 206 1 30,044
Mexico 3 3 1,316 0
Morocco 0 0 0
Netherlands 10 10 925 0
Norway 1 1 3,270 0
Pakistan 1 1 28 0
Peru 5 5 128 0
Philippines 1 1 331 0
Poland 2 2 227 0
Singapore 7 7 529 0
SouthAfrica 13 13 635 0
Spain 4 4 504 0
SriLanka 0 0 0
Sweden 1 1 3 0
Switzerland 33 31 207 2 37,641
Thailand 3 3 1,832 0
Turkey 2 2 1,052 0
UK 37 32 1,055 5 27,868
USA 288 280 502 8 53,108
Venezuela 1 1 1,128 0
Total 
failures
Large banks are those with assets greater than 10 billion US$.
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Chapter 4
How Risky are Banks’
Risk-Weighted Assets?
Evidence from the Financial
Crisis
“The leverage ratio - a simple ratio of capital to balance-sheet assets - and
the more complex risk-based requirements work well together. The leverage
requirement provides a baseline level of capital to protect the safety net, while
the risk-based requirement can capture additional risks that are not covered
by the leverage framework. The more advanced and complex the models be-
come, the greater the need for such a baseline. The leverage ratio ensures
that a capital backstop remains even if model errors or other miscalculations
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impair the reliability of risk-based capital. This is a crucial consideration
- particularly as we work through the implementation of Basel II standard.
By restraining balance-sheet growth, the leverage ratio promotes stability and
resilience during difficult economic periods.”
- Remarks by Sheila Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion before the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Merida, Mexico,
October 4, 2006.
4.1 Introduction
The financial crisis that begain in 2007 has exposed a number of weaknesses in
banking regulation. Capital requirements are the primary tool of bank capi-
tal regulation, making how to appropriately determine the riskiness of bank’s
portfolios a key challenge for banks, regulators, and investors. Risk-weighted
assets (RWA) are an important element of risk-based capital ratios as banks
can increase their capital adequacy ratios in two ways: (i) by increasing the
amount of regulatory capital held, which boosts the numerator of the ratio,
or (ii) by decreasing risk-weighted assets, which is the denominator of the
regulatory ratio. The principle that regulatory capital requirements should
be tied to the risks taken by banks was accepted internationally and formal-
ized with the Basel I accord in 1988, and the definition of acceptable forms
of capital and guidelines for measuring risk have undergone several revisions
since that time. The second Basel accord, published in 2004, recommended
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that banks hold total regulatory capital equal to at least 8 percent of their
risk-weighted assets. The recently updated Basel III guidelines recommend
increasing the amount of capital that should be held and emphasize higher
quality forms of capital, but continue the approach of calculating capital re-
quirements relative to their risk-weighted assets.1 Basel III also proposes a
non-risk-weighted leverage ratio as a complementary measure.2
A key concern about current methods of calculating risk-weighted assets is
that they leave room for individual banks to “optimize” capital requirements
by underestimating their risks and thus being permitted to hold lower capital.
Jones (2000) discusses techniques banks can use to engage in regulatory cap-
ital arbitrage and provides evidence on the magnitude of these activities in
the Unites States. Merton (1995) provides an example in which, in place of a
portfolio of mortgages, a bank can hold the economic equivalent of that port-
folio at a risk-weight one-eighth as large. Innovations in financial products
since the first Basel accord have also likely made it easier for financial insti-
tutions to manipulate their regulatory risk measure. Acharya, Schnabl, and
Suarez (forthcoming) analyze asset-backed commercial paper and find evi-
dence suggesting that banks used this form of securitization to concentrate,
rather than disperse, financial risks in the banking sector while reducing
bank capital requirements. In addition to concerns about underestimating
1Basel III capital standards require minimum common equity, Tier 1 capital, and total
capital equal to 4.5, 6, and 8 percent of risk-weighted assets, respectively. In addition,
the standards recommend an additional capital conservation buffer of 2.5 percent of risk-
weighted assets. Supervisors can add a countercyclical buffer in the range of 0-2.5 percent.
2The specific definition and enforcement of the leverage ratio under Basel III is pending.
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the riskiness of assets, there are differences in calculation of risk-weighted as-
sets across countries that may have unintended effects on financial stability.
Lord Adair Turner, chairman of the UK Financial Services Authority, warned
last June that international differences in the calculation of risk-weighted as-
sets could undermine Basel III3 and Sheila Bair, former chairman of the US
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, added her concern that Europe and
the US may be diverging in their calculation of their risk-weighted assets:
“The risk weightings are highly variable in Europe and have led to contin-
uing declines in capital levels, even in the recession. There’s pretty strong
evidence that the RWA calculation isn’t working as it’s supposed to.”4
In this paper, we ask whether equity investors find banks’ reported risk-
weighted assets to be a credible measure of risk. First, did banks with lower
risk-weighted assets have higher stock returns during the recent financial cri-
sis? Second, do measures of risk based on equity market information corre-
spond to risk-weighted assets? Demirguc¸-Kunt, Detragiache, and Merrouche
(2010) and Beltratti and Stulz (forthcoming) also study banks’ stock return
performance during the financial crisis, focusing primarily on the effect of
different measures of capital and bank governance, respectively. Our paper
studies whether markets price bank risk as measured by RWA, to inform the
debate on how best to measure the risks embedded in banks’ portfolios.
3Risk Magazine, June 24, 2011, “FSA’s Turner: RWA divergence would under-
mine Basel III” www.risk.net/risk-magazine/news/2081533/fsas-turner-rwa-divergence-
undermine-basel-iii
4Risk Magazine, June 24, 2011, “Europe lax on RWA calculations, says Bair”
www.risk.net/risk-magazine/news/2081139/europe-lax-rwa-calculations-bair
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Figure 4.1: Decrease in risk-weighted assets at US BHCs
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The ratio of aggregate risk-weighted assets to tangible assets at all bank holding
companies (BHC) in the United States. The tangible assets of a bank are equal to
total assets minus intangibles and goodwill.
4.2 Stylized facts
The past decade has seen a decrease in the measured risk-weighted assets
of banks, as well as a decrease in the quality of capital held by banks. For
instance, there is a downward trend in the aggregate ratio of risk-weighted
assets to tangible assets for US bank holding companies since the late 1990s,
shown in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.2 shows the downward trend in three measures of capital as a
percentage of risk-weighted assets at bank holding companies in the United
States in the years preceding the crisis. This decline is sharpest in tangi-
ble common equity, which has the greatest loss-absorbing capacity, and less
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Figure 4.2: Quality of regulatory capital at US BHCs
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Tangible common equity (TCE) is equal to common equity minus intangibles and
goodwill. Tier 1 capital includes shareholders equity, both common equity and
non-cumulative preferred stock, and retained earnings. Tier 2 capital includes
subordinated debt, hybrid instruments - such as perpetual preferred stock, revalu-
ation reserves, general provisions, and undisclosed reserved are also permitted by
regulators in some countries. Total capital is the sum of Tier 1 capital and Tier 2
capital.
pronounced in total regulatory capital.
There are also differences in RWA between geographical regions. On
average, European banks have much lower RWA as a share of their total
assets than banks in North America or Asia (see Figure 4.3).
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Figure 4.3: Ratio of RWA to total assets in Asia, Europe and North America
(2002-2010)
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Source: Bloomberg, SNL Financial. Aggregate ratios of RWA to total assets
for banks in Asia, Europe, and North America. Data are for a sample of the largest
banks in each region.
4.3 Risk-weighted assets: Basel II Standardized and
IRB Approaches
The 1998 Basel I Accord proposed a simple framework for measuring risk
based on risk buckets’ for four broad categories of claims: sovereigns, banks,
mortgages, and corporate. In contrast, Basel II aimed at improving the risk
sensitivity of capital requirements. A prelude to the Basel II internal ratings-
based (IRB) approach was the adoption by the Basel Committee in 1996 of
the value-at-risk (VaR) approach to determine capital requirements for mar-
ket risk (subsequently integrated into the Basel II framework). The 2004
Basel II accord extended a similar approach to credit risk. It opened the way
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for banks to determine risk-weights using external credit rating agencies or
their own internal ratings systems based on historical default data, after su-
pervisory validation, and to calculate the parameters of a uniform regulatory
formula.
For banks not (yet) deemed by supervisors to be able to implement model-
based approaches, Basel II contemplated simplified approaches for each of the
risk categories it covered. In particular, the Standardized Approach (SA) for
credit risk provided a much more differentiated treatment of exposures than
Basel I, while allowing risk-weights for each exposure to vary according to
ratings issued by external credit rating agencies. However, although external
ratings could drive risk weights significantly higher than Basel I’s highest
weight of 100 percent, they could also drive them much lower. Moreover,
in the important case of home mortgage loans, the risk weight was reduced
from 50 to 35 percent.
The Basel II IRB approach is built on three risk parameters: (i) the
probability of default (PD), which describes the likelihood that an obligor
will default, (ii) the exposure at default (EAD), and (iii) the loss given
default (LGD), which describes the loss rate on the exposure in the event
of default.5 Indeed, the level of regulatory capital that a bank should hold
depends on the amount of loss it is expected to exceed with a small, pre-
defined probability – the Value-at-Risk (VaR). Capital is set according to the
5The Basel II IRB formula is based on an asymptotic single-risk factor (ASRF) model.
See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005).
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bank’s unexpected loss (UL) which is the gap between the bank’s expected
loss (EL) and Value-at-Risk at a certain confidence level, over a one-year
horizon. The expected loss is calculated as follows:
EL = PD × EAD × LGD or, in percentage of EAD,EL% = PD × LGD.
The supervisory capital charge as a percentage of the exposure (K) is
set using a Merton model which depends on PD and LGD. Risk-weighted
assets (RWA) are then expressed as a function of the capital requirement and
the minimum capital ratio of 8 percent (or its reciprocal 12.5):
RWA = 12.5×K × EAD.
It is important to note that under the Basel II IRB approaches, banks have
considerable discretion in reporting their own average PD, and also EAD
and LGD under the advanced IRB.
Basel III improves risk weights on exposures to market risk but leaves
Basel II standardized approach (SA) risk weights on credit risk exposures
unchanged. However, banks are now expected to use higher than external-
ratings-based risk weights if their own risk assessment so warrants.
4.4 Related literature
This study expands on two main strands of literature. First, this paper is re-
lated to studies of bank resilience during the recent financial crisis. Demirguc¸-
Kunt, Detragiache, and Merrouche (2010) find that capital was positively
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related to banks’ stock returns during the crisis6 and Beltratti and Stulz
(forthcoming) find that large banks with more capital7 and higher reliance
on deposits for short-term funding in 2006 had higher stock returns dur-
ing the crisis, but these factors did not have a robust impact on bank risk,
as measured by the bank’s idiosyncratic volatility and distance-to-default.
In earlier works, Kim and Santomero (1988) use a mean-variance model to
evaluate the effectiveness of both a uniform capital ratio requirement and a
risk-related capital plan in controlling bank risk and derive theoretically cor-
rect risk-weights to maintain banking system soundness, and Berger, Herring
and Szego (1995) discuss the difficulty of developing an accurate measure of
risk exposure that is reasonably simple and can be uniformly applied across
banks.
Second, we build on the empirical literature that studies bank risk-taking
and regulatory risk in the United States. Avery and Berger (1991b) and
Bradley et al (1991) find that RWA for banks and for thrifts, respectively, are
positively related to the bank or thrift’s probability of failure and accounting
measures of risk, but that these relationships are fairly weak. Cordell and
King (1995) compare stock market measures of risk to regulatory risk-based
capital measures for banks and thrifts in the United States in 1990. Their
6Specifically, they find that during the crisis, a stronger capital position was associated
with better stock market performance, most markedly for larger banks, and the relation-
ship between stock returns and capital is stronger when capital is measured by the leverage
ratio (capital to total assets) rather than the risk-adjusted capital ratio.
7They test both the ratio of Tier1 capital to RWA and tangible equity to total assets.
The regulatory ratio is found to be statistically significant in most regression specifications.
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results suggest that market and risk-based capital standards agree to some
extent on the adequacy of institutions’ current capital, but the measures of
asset risk are not positively correlated.
Most importantly, we shed light on the credibility of RWA as currently
measured. The debate on the appropriate capital requirements for banks has
reached consensus on higher capital requirements, but the discussion of ap-
propriate measurement of asset-risk has come to the forefront only recently.
Acharya (2011) notes that the importance of residential housing as an asset
class increased endogenously in response to the low risk weights on residen-
tial mortgage backed securities in capital requirements and, although the
subprime crisis showed that banks were clearly not holding enough capital
against these assets, the relatively low risk weight on this asset class has con-
tinued. The significance of the problem is also clear in the current Eurozone
sovereign debt crisis. The zero risk weights on European banks’ holdings of
the debt of their sovereigns are clearly not in line with current assessments
of their riskiness.
In studying the effects of government bailouts, Duchin and Ross (2012)
find evidence that bailed-out banks approve riskier loans and shift investment
portfolios toward riskier securities. This shift in risk occurs mostly within
the same asset class and therefore has little effect on the closely monitored
capitalization levels. Consequently, bailed-out banks appear safer according
to the capitalization requirements, but show a significant increase in market-
based measures of risk. They conclude that those banks’ responses to capital
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requirements may erode their efficacy in risk regulation.
To what extent are differences between regulatory and market assess-
ments of risk problematic? Market discipline requires investors to both (i)
monitor the condition of banks and incorporate those assessments into their
stock prices, and (ii) influence the managers of banks through these changes
in stock prices (Bliss and Flannery 2001). This study does not delve into
whether market participants are able to influence banks managers but in-
stead focuses on the first, necessary, component of discipline. That is, how
does the market assess the riskiness of banks based on their regulatory re-
ports, balance-sheet, and income statements? Even if markets are not able to
influence manager’s actions,8 an understanding of their assessments is impor-
tant in that bank regulators and supervisors can incorporate this information
into their assessments and actions.
4.5 Data and Methodology
The sample consists of 804 publicly-listed deposit-taking institutions9 in 32
countries, spanning North America, Europe, Asia, and Australia. These are
listed in Table 4.12 of the appendix. The balance-sheet and income statement
8There is some support for market influence in banking. Flannery and Rangan (2002)
document a build-up of regulatory and market equity capital in large U.S. bank holding
companies from 1986 and 2000, beyond levels necessary to meet regulatory standards, and
attribute this increase in capital to enhanced market incentives to monitor and price large
banks’ default risk. Barrios and Blanco (2003) argue that Spanish banks’ capital ratios
over the period 1985–1991 were primarily driven by the pressure of market forces rather
than regulatory constraints.
9Institutions with a deposit/asset ratio above 20 percent and a loan/asset ratio above
10 percent, as in Beltratti and Stulz (forthcoming).
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data are from the Bankscope database, which has good coverage from 2004
onwards, and the stock return data is from Datastream. We discard obvious
mistakes in the data as well as outliers at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels.
Banks performed poorly over the crisis, with an average stock return of
−42 percent from June 30, 2007 to December 30, 2008, as shown in Table 4.1.
The recent financial instability originating from concerns about the sovereign
debt of Eurozone countries has also been accompanied by poor performance
of banks. Their average stock return was −13 percent over the three month
period from June 30, 2011 to September 30, 2011. In both cases, the standard
deviations of the returns are quite large, showing a large variation in bank
performance during periods of instability.
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics – bank stock returns over periods of crisis
June 2007 to Dec 2008 June 2011 to Sep 2011
(769 obs) (804 obs)
Mean -41.67 -13.15
Std. Dev. 31.09 19.59
Min -99.97 -75.28
Max 62.59 192.36
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the stock returns of the banks in the sample
for two periods: (1) June 30, 2007 to December 30, 2008 corresponding to the
subprime crisis, and (2) June 30, 2011 to September 30, 2011 corresponding to the
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.
Our first hypothesis is that banks with higher risk-weighted assets will
perform worse during a period of crisis. This would be an indication that
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markets do give credence to the regulatory measure of asset-risk. In other
words, investors expect banks with higher RWA to have larger LGDs during
the financial crisis. We separate banks’ regulatory capital ratios into simple
leverage ratios and RWA scaled by tangible assets, to determine the effects
of RWA on stock returns while controlling for the capital of the bank.10
H1 Banks with lower RWA performed better during the crisis.
Second, we expect a positive relationship between capital and stock returns,
since capital functions as a buffer against adverse shocks by providing loss
absorbency beyond provisions and other expected-loss buffers. A higher share
of customer deposits in funding decreases the susceptibility of banks to runs,
so we expect banks with more stable funding to perform better during periods
of crisis. There may also be a trade-off between these two factors, in that
banks with higher capital are better able to withstand funding problems.
H2 Banks with higher capital ratios will had higher stock returns during
the crisis and banks with more stable funding had higher stock returns
during the crisis.
H2a Banks with more stable funding did not receive as high a reward for
higher capital, compared to banks with less stable funding.
Third, if RWA are a good measure of asset-risk, we expect they will be
positively related to market-based measures of risk. The relationship between
10For example: Tier1CapitalRWA =
Tier1Capital
TangibleAssets × TangibleAssetsRWA . Previous studies include
either the regulatory capital ratio or the simple leverage ratio, which does not allow for a
direct test of the effect of RWA on performance.
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the two, if found, could change in either direction after the crisis. The onset
of the crisis could render RWA less credible to investors, or the increase in
risk-aversion associated with crisis could result in increased sensitivity to any
available information on asset-risk.
H3 Market measures of bank risk will be positively correlated with RWA.
We estimate two models to test these hypotheses. In the first, we focus on
the effects of risk-weighted assets and capital adequacy on the cross-section
of banks’ stock returns, while controlling for other balance-sheet measures of
risk exposure. We perform OLS estimation of equation 4.1:
ri = θ0 + θ1(RWA/TA)i,t−1 + θ2(Capital/TA) +Xi,t−1γ1 + νt (4.1)
where the dependent variable ri is the real stock return in US dollars from
June 30, 2007 to December 30, 2008 for bank i. This is the period over
which there was a sharp decline in aggregate stock market indexes.11 We
also study stock returns over the three-month period from June 30, 2011 to
Sep 30, 2011 to compare market reactions in the recent European sovereign
debt crisis to the first phase of the global financial crisis. In both cases, all
of the explanatory variables are lagged by one year.
11The U.S. Department of the Treasury established the Troubled Assets Relief Program,
in which they infused capital into qualifying financial institutions, in October 2008. This
may have had an effect on bank’s stock returns unrelated to underlying soundness of banks.
For this reason we estimate equation (1) using the period preceding TARP, from June 20,
2007 to September 30, 2008, as a robustness check and find the results to be quantitatively
similar.
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The main explanatory variables of interest are the ratio of risk-weighted
assets to tangible assets and the capital ratio.12 We use tangible common
equity (total equity minus preferred shares, intangibles, and goodwill) as our
measure of bank capital in most specifications as one can expect holders of
non-TCE capital instruments to have had weaker incentives to monitor bank
risk-taking than common equity shareholders in the run up to the recent
financial crisis.
The other explanatory variables, in Xi,t−1, are:
i Stability of funding, measured as the share of customer deposits in total
deposits and short-term funding13
ii The ratio of securities to assets
iii The share of non-performing loans
iv Return on average assets, a measure of the bank profitability
v The log of assets, to proxy for bank size
vi Country dummies, to control for differences in the institutional and
regulatory environments across countries
12Three different measures of capital are (i) tangible common equity, (ii) Tier 1 regu-
latory capital, and (iii) Total regulatory capital. Tier 1 capital consists of shareholder’s
funds, perpetual non-cumulative preference share, and retained earnings. Tier 2 capi-
tal includes hybrid capital, subordinated debt, loan loss reserves, and valuation reserves.
Total regulatory capital is equal to the sum of Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital. After
comparing three different measures of capital in our first specification, we proceed to use
tangible common equity (total equity minus preferred shares, intangibles, and goodwill
from total equity, where the data is available) as our measure of bank capital in the rest
of the paper.
13This is equal to 100 − x where x is the funding fragility measure of Demirguc¸-Kunt
and Huizinga (2009): deposits from other banks, other deposits, and short-term borrowing
as a fraction of total deposits plus money market funding.
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vii Dummy variables to control for the business model of the bank14
Table 4.2 reports descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables in 2006
and 2010.
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics – explanatory variables
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
RWA/TangibleAssets 41.89 31.67 66.38 14.87
TCE/TangibleAssets 7.92 5.41 7.04 3.93
Tier 1 Capital/TangibleAssets 9.01 5.01 8.69 3.49
Total Capital/TangibleAssets 6.31 6.60 9.93 3.57
CustDeposits 90.44 12.05 91.15 11.31
Securities/Assets 20.26 11.86 22.20 11.88
NPL/Loans 1.66 2.72 4.41 4.78
ROAA 0.88 0.85 0.37 1.17
Assets - millions USD 55,900 228,000 83,764 316,632
Beta 0.24 1.06 1.00 1.33
2006 2010
(769 obs)  (804 obs)
The variables are the ratio of risk-weighted assets to tangible assets, capital ratios
(tangible common equity (TCE)), Tier1 Capital, and Total regulatory capital,
all divided by tangible assets (TA)), the share of stable (customer) deposits, the
share of securities in the bank’s assets, the share of non-performing loans (NPL),
the return on assets, assets, and the bank’s stock’s beta with a national market
index.
The share of customer deposits in total deposits is expected to increase a
bank’s stability since these deposits are less likely to be withdrawn in a bank
run, due to deposit insurance.15 Gorton (2010) and others have described
14Bank holding companies, commercial banks, cooperative banks, investment banks,
real estate and mortgage banks, and savings banks
15Our measure is equal to 100 – x where x is the funding fragility measure of Demirguc¸-
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the recent crisis as a run in non-retail funding markets. We expect a positive
relationship between the stability of funding and banks’ stock returns.
A second specification of this model includes an interaction term between
the capital ratio and funding stability. This is to test the notion that there
is a trade-off in the capital adequacy and funding required to satisfy markets
of a bank’s health. A negative coefficient on the interaction term between
funding stability and the capital ratio suggests that banks with more stable
funding are not required to hold as much capital in order to receive the same
stock return, compared to a banks with fragile funding.
The second model is a panel estimation of how the explanatory variables
described above are related to banks’ systematic risk – beta from a Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). We perform a panel estimation of equation
4.2 over the period from 2004 to 2010:
Riski = µj + δ1(RWA/TA)i,t−1 + δ2(Capital/TA) +Xi,t−1γ1 + νi,t (4.2)
The explanatory variables are as in equation 4.1 and we alternately include
country fixed effects, to control for time-invariant country-specific factors
that may affect bank systematic risk, and bank fixed effects, to study the
dynamic relationship between bank systematic risk and RWA. We also in-
clude year dummies to control for macroeconomic shocks that may affect
bank stock returns. The dependent variable, Riski,t, is the coefficient β from
Kunt and Huizinga (2009).
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the following model:
rit − rft = αi + β(rMt − rft) + βW (rWt − rft) + it (4.3)
estimated over the previous 60 month period. Nominal stock prices in US
dollars are deflated by the CPI to obtain real returns, rf,t is the 3-month US
Treasury bill rate adjusted to a one month risk-free rate, rM,t is the MSCI
national market index for the country M in which bank i is headquartered,
and rW,t is the MSCI World index. That is, for each bank-year observation in
model 4.3, β is estimated using monthly, US-dollar, real excess returns over
the last 5 years.
4.6 Results and Discussion
4.6.1 Determinants of stock returns
Market perceptions of risk-weighted assets
Table 4.3 presents the results of our benchmark estimation of equation 4.1,
the determinants of stock returns over 2007-2008 crisis period. As expected,
we find that stock returns are lower for banks with higher risk-weighted as-
sets. The estimated coefficient in column (1) indicated that banks with a one
percentage point higher RWA to tangible assets ratio have a stock return that
is 0.075 percent lower. The estimated coefficients on the three different capi-
tal ratios are not statistically significant but their magnitudes are consistent
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with the finding of Demirguc¸-Kunt, Detragiache, and Merrouche (2010) that
certain types of capital matter more in explaining stock returns. The signs
of the coefficients on the additional explanatory variables are as expected.
Higher stock returns are associated with more stable funding, more securi-
ties holdings, a lower share of non-performing loans, and a higher accounting
return on assets. However, only the share of securities to assets, and the
accounting return on assets have a strong statistical relationship with the
stock returns.
Table 4.4 shows the same estimation on the sample restricted to larger
banks, with assets greater than 50 billion US dollars in 2006. The coefficient
on RWA is also negative and statistically significant in this sample. Large
banks with a 1 percent point higher RWA to tangible assets ratio have a 0.39
percent lower stock return, on average. Large banks are different than the
rest of the sample in that access to stable short term funding seems to be
more important for them than securities holdings. The coefficient on funding
stability is now statistically significant while the coefficient on the ratio of
securities in assets is not. A one percentage point increase in the share of
stable funding at a large bank is associated with a stock return that is 0.63
percent higher, on average. As with the whole sample, higher net income as
indicated by a higher ROAA, is rewarded with a higher stock return.
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Table 4.3: Determinants of returns – Do risk-weighted assets affect stock
returns?
Dependent variable: Crisis stock return
(1) (2) (3)
RWA/TangibleAssets -0.075*** -0.054 -0.065**
(0.027) (0.033) (0.027)
TCE/TangibleAssets 0.066
(0.195)
Tier1capital/TangibleAssets -0.307
(0.209)
TotalCapital/TangibleAssets -0.065
(0.184)
CustDeposits 0.122 0.101 0.126
(0.087) (0.093) (0.089)
Securities/Assets 0.759*** 0.783*** 0.763***
(0.116) (0.106) (0.120)
NPL/Loans -0.338 -0.359 -0.349
(0.216) (0.226) (0.226)
ROAA 6.052*** 5.542*** 5.815***
(0.707) (0.678) (0.678)
log(Assets) -0.032 -0.510 -0.120
(1.277) (1.306) (1.139)
Beta -0.069 0.018 -0.031
(0.805) (0.796) (0.786)
Observations 769 762 769
Adj R-squared 0.210 0.209 0.210
The table presents regressions for banks in 32 countries. The dependent variable is
the bank’s stock return over the period from June 30, 2007 to December 30, 2008.
The independent variables, all values for 2006, are the ratio of risk-weighted assets
to tangible assets, capital ratios (tangible common equity (TCE)), Tier1 Capital,
and Total regulatory capital, all divided by tangible assets), the share of stable
deposits, the share of securities in the bank’s assets, the share of non-performing
loans, the return on assets, the log of assets, and the stock’s beta with a national
market index. Country dummy variables and dummy variables representing the
bank’s business model are included. Standard errors (in parentheses below the
coefficient estimates) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity following Huber (1967)
and White (1980), and generalized for clustering at the country level. ***, **, and
* indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively.
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Table 4.4: Determinants of returns – Do risk-weighted assets affect stock
returns of large banks?
Large banks: Assets>50 Billion US$
Dependent variable: Crisis stock return
(1) (2) (3)
RWA/TangibleAssets -0.388*** -0.448*** -0.678*
(0.108) (0.127) (0.353)
TCE/RWAfloor -0.559
(1.430)
Tier1capital/RWAfloor 1.666
(2.463)
TotalCapital/RWAfloor 2.264
(2.670)
CustomerDeposits 0.625** 0.532** 0.578**
(0.272) (0.217) (0.223)
Securities/Assets 0.100 0.090 0.019
(0.303) (0.304) (0.312)
NPL/Loans 0.692 1.161 0.936
(1.516) (1.654) (1.466)
ROAA 21.200*** 18.980*** 18.323***
(6.519) (6.567) (6.539)
log(Assets) -0.627 -0.189 -0.222
(2.760) (2.879) (2.851)
Beta 0.175 -0.221 -0.441
(3.451) (3.472) (3.415)
Observations 90 90 90
Adj R-squared 0.595 0.597 0.598
The table presents regressions for large banks in 32 countries – those with total
assets greater than 50 billion US dollars in 2006. The dependent variable is the
bank’s stock return over the period from June 30, 2007 to December 30, 2008. The
independent variables are as in Table 4.3.
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Is there a capital-funding trade-off?
We find a trade-off between capital and funding in terms of their positive
effects on bank stock returns. Table 4.5 presents the results of the estimation
of model 4.1 in which an interaction term between capital and funding sta-
bility is included. The negative coefficient on the interaction term in column
(2) shows that the more stable a bank’s funding, the less positive the effect
of higher capital on its stock return. Column (3) indicates that this trade-off
exists for large banks as well.
Differences by Basel credit risk measurement method
At the time of the subprime crisis, countries had made different degrees
of progress towards becoming following Basel II guidelines. The EU Capital
Requirements Directive required that countries in the European Union im-
plement the Basel II guidelines by the time of the crisis, generally initially
following the standardized approach to measuring credit risk, while many
countries were still following Basel I guidelines. Table 4.6 shows the dates
of implementation of the Basel II approaches (standardized and advanced
approaches) in different countries.
We investigate whether the relationship between stock returns and RWA
is the same for banks in Basel I and Basel II countries by adding a country-
level indicator variable for counties that had moved to the Basel II Stan-
dardized Approach by the time of the crisis, as well as interaction between
the indicator and RWA/TA, to equation (1) 4.1. We also include dummy
variables for each region, North America, Europe, and Asia, in these spec-
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ifications and, in order to ensure that the results are not being driven by
differences in accounting methods, we also include indicator variables to con-
trol for the accounting regime being followed by each bank.16
The results are presented in Table 4.7. Column (2) shows that for the
whole sample, there is no significantly different effects of RWA/TA on returns
for banks in countries that were Basel II compliant. For large banks, however,
the negative relationship between RWA and returns is significantly smaller
when banks are in Basel II countries.
The results presented in this section are robust to using the stock re-
turn from June 30, 2007 to September 30, 2008, the phase of the financial
crisis before the beginning of government capital purchase programs, as the
dependent variable.
16Le Lesle´ and Avramova (2012) note that a key difference between the International Fi-
nancial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) is that the relevant off-balance-sheet assets can be calculated net of derivatives in
the GAAP, suggesting RWA would be lower under GAAP than under IFRS, all else equal.
They find, however, that RWA do not appear to be different across different accounting
methods in a sample of fifty internationally active banks in 25 countries.
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Table 4.5: Determinants of returns – Is there a capital-funding trade-off?
Dependent variable: Crisis stock return
(1) (2) (3)
All banks All banks Large banks
RWA/TangibleAssets -0.075*** -0.088** -0.339***
(0.027) (0.034) (0.116)
TCE/TangibleAssets 0.066 3.710* 4.636*
(0.195) (2.124) (2.497)
CustDeposits 0.122 0.395** 0.878***
(0.087) (0.170) (0.288)
  (TCE/TangibleAssets)*CustDeposits -0.039* -0.072**
(0.021) (0.035)
Securities/Assets 0.759*** 0.739*** 0.165
(0.116) (0.120) (0.307)
NPL/Loans -0.338 -0.322 2.421
(0.216) (0.201) (1.896)
ROAA 6.052*** 4.947*** 19.127***
(0.707) (0.671) (5.890)
log(Assets) -0.032 0.366 -1.301
(1.277) (1.262) (2.623)
Beta -0.069 0.049 0.851
(0.805) (0.692) (3.411)
Observations 769 769 90
Adj R-squared 0.210 0.213 0.609
The table presents regressions for banks in 32 countries. The dependent variable is
the bank’s stock return over the period from June 30, 2007 to December 30, 2008.
Columns (1) and (2) present the whole sample, and column (3) present results for
the sample of large banks – banks with assets greater than 50 billion US dollars
in 2006. The independent variables are as in Table table:rwareg1 and additionally
include an interaction term between the capital ratio (TCE/tangible assets) and
stable deposits.
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Table 4.6: Basel II implementation schedules – credit risk measurement
Standardized approach Advanced approaches
Australia Jan 2008 Jan 2008
Austria Jan 2007 Jan 2008
Belgium Jan 2007 Jan 2008
Canada Nov 2007 Nov 2007
China NA 2011-2013
Denmark Jan 2007 Jan 2008
Finland Jan 2007 Jan 2008
France Jan 2007 Jan 2008
Germany Jan 2007 Jan 2008
Greece Jan 2007 Jan 2008
Hong Kong Jan 2007 Jan 2007
India April 2007 post Dec 2011
Indonesia Jan 2009 Oct 2010
Italy Jan 2007 Jan 2008
Japan March 2007 March 2008
Korea Dec 2007 Dec 2007
Malaysia Jan 2008 Jan 2010
Norway Jan 2007 Jan 2008
Philippines Jul 2007 post 2010
Poland Jan 2007 Jan 2008
Russian Federation Jul 2012 NA
Singapore March 2007 Jan 2008
Spain Jan 2007 Jan 2008
Sri Lanka Jan 2008 post 2010
Sweden Jan 2007 Jan 2008
Switzerland Jan 2007 Jan 2008
Taiwan end 2006 NA
Thailand Jan 2009 Jan 2009
Turkey June 2011 NA
Ukraine NA NA
UK Jan 2008 Jan 2008
USA NA mid-2009 for 'core banks'
NA=not announced
Sources: Supervisory agency websites and surveys,and IMF Financial 
Stability Assessment Program Reports.
‘Core banks’ are those that have consolidated total assets ≥ $250 billion, consoli-
dated on-balance-sheet foreign exposure ≥ $10 billion, or are subsidiaries of a core
bank.
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Table 4.7: Determinants of returns – Basel I versus Basel II standardized
approach to measuring RWA
Dependent variable: Crisis stock return
(1) (2) (3)
All banks All banks Large banks
Basel II indicator 2.946 -29.371**
(8.461) (12.939)
RWA/TA -0.077** -0.108*** -0.435***
(0.029) (0.024) (0.089)
Basel II * RWA/TA 0.067 0.430**
(0.075) (0.198)
TCE/TA -0.175 -0.110 -0.214
(0.347) (0.278) (1.274)
CustDeposits 0.255* 0.257* 0.527***
(0.147) (0.135) (0.193)
Securities/Assets 0.661*** 0.634*** 0.187
(0.179) (0.197) (0.204)
NPL/Loans -0.336 -0.213 -0.787
(0.361) (0.288) (1.110)
ROAA 4.048** 4.268** 10.970*
(1.852) (1.621) (5.889)
log(Assets) -0.274 -0.204 -0.818
(1.183) (1.222) (2.239)
Beta -0.453 -0.371 -2.014
(1.018) (0.909) (2.644)
Observations 769 769 90
Adj R-squared 0.151 0.153 0.422
The table presents regressions for banks in 32 countries. The dependent variable is
the bank’s stock return over the period from June 30, 2007 to December 30, 2008.
Columns (1) and (2) present the whole sample, and column (3) present results for
the sample of large banks – banks with assets greater than 50 billion US dollars
in 2006. The independent variables are an indicator variable for countries that
use the Basel II Standardized Approach to calculating RWA, and an interaction
with the bank’s RWA to tangible assets, the capital ratios (tangible Common
Equity (TCE) divided by tangible assets (TA)), the share of stable deposits, the
share of securities in the bank’s assets, the share of non-performing loans, and the
return on assets. The log of assets, the stock’s beta with a national market index,
regional dummies, and dummy variables representing the bank’s business model
are included in each specification.
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4.6.2 Market risk and balance-sheet measures of risk
exposure
This section presents the results of estimating equation (3.2), to study the
relationship between a bank systematic risk and RWA. Column (1) of Table
4.8 presents the estimation results for the period from 2004 to 2010, including
country fixed effects. There is no significant relationship between systematic
risk and RWA. After including bank fixed effects in column (2), however,
the estimated coefficient on RWA/TA is positive and significant. In the
first instance we controlled for time-invariant country-specific unobservables,
while the specification with bank fixed effects controls instead for any bank-
level unobserved variables that do not vary over time. Thus, it appears
there is no static relationship where banks with higher RWA have greater
systematic risk, but instead, banks with higher RWA have greater systematic
risk over time. The coefficient of 0.005 in column (2) suggests that a one
standard deviation increase corresponds to a 0.12 standard deviation increase
in systematic risk. Turning to the coefficients on the control variables, we
see that the factors that are positively related to stock return performance
are negatively related to systematic risk, as expected.
We next split the sample into two periods, the three years prior to the
start of the crisis from 2004 to 2006 and three after the onset from 2008
to 2010, and estimate model (3.2) on both samples to investigate whether
there is a change in the factors that affect systematic risk. Shown in Table
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4.9, the Chow test rejects the hypothesis that the relationship is the same
before and since the crisis for several explanatory variables: the RWA ratio,
the share of securities in assets, non-performing loans, and return on assets.
The relationship between RWA/TA and systematic risk is positive before the
crisis, but negative since the crisis.
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4.7 Performance during the Eurozone debt crisis
We check the robustness of the negative relationship between bank stock
returns and RWA in this section, by estimating equation 4.1 for a recent
period of financial instability – the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. We find
that the negative relationship between RWA and stock returns is robust to
the different time period.
Table 4.10 shows the results of model (3.1) estimated for the period from
June 30, 2011 to September 30, 2011. The signs of the coefficients are the
same as for model 4.1 estimated over 2007-2008 crisis period, however only
RWA/TA, return on assets, and bank size had a statistically measurable
effect on the stock returns in this period.
Next, we differentiate between the method used to calculate credit risk,
similar to Table 4.7 presented above for the subprime crisis. By 2010, banks
in several countries had moved towards using one of the Basel II advanced
approaches to measuring credit risk (FIRB or AIRB), while many were us-
ing the Basel II standardized approach (SA), and some were still following
Basel I guidelines. The estimated coefficients on Basel II SA*RWA/TA in
Table 4.11 suggests that the relationship between RWA and returns is less
negative for banks using the Basel II SA, compared to those using Basel I.
The relationship is not significantly different for banks following one of the
advanced approaches.
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Table 4.10: Determinants of returns – performance during the European
sovereign debt crisis
Dependent variable: Stock return from June 2011 to Sep 2011
(1) (2) (3)
All banks Excluding US Large banks
RWA/TangibleAssets -0.095+ -0.243*** -0.026
(0.057) (0.068) (0.166)
TCE/TangibleAssets -0.021 0.424 0.759
(0.070) (0.359) (1.491)
CustDeposits 0.039 0.024 -0.064
(0.046) (0.071) (0.112)
Securities/Assets 0.052 -0.031 0.018
(0.035) (0.076) (0.145)
NPL/Loans -0.254 -0.053 -0.221
(0.187) (0.179) (0.737)
ROAA 2.584*** 1.101 6.305*
(0.284) (0.937) (3.146)
log(Assets) -2.977*** -1.704** -4.024*
(0.440) (0.624) (2.359)
Beta -0.254 -2.456 -1.409
(0.204) (3.069) (1.626)
Observations 804 304 129
Adj R-squared 0.363 0.722 0.707
The table presents regressions for banks in 32 countries. The dependent variable is
the bank’s stock return over the period from June 30, 2011 to September 30, 2011.
The independent variables, all values for 2010, are the ratio of risk-weighted assets
to tangible assets, the capital ratio (tangible common equity (TCE) to tangible
assets (TA)), the share of stable deposits, the share of securities in the bank’s
assets, the share of non-performing loans, the return on assets, the log of assets,
and the stock’s beta with a national market index. Country dummies and dummy
variables representing the bank’s business model are included in each specification.
Column (1) presents the whole sample of banks, column (2) the sample excluding
banks based in the United States, and column (3) the banks with total assets
greater than 50 billion US dollars in 2010.
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Table 4.11: Determinants of returns during the European sovereign debt
crisis – Basel I versus Basel II approaches to measuring RWA
Dependent variable: Stock return from June 2011 to Sep 2011
(1) (1) (2)
All banks All banks Excluding US
Basel II SA indicator -28.565** -37.732**
(11.211) (15.532)
Basel II Advanced indicator 14.742 2.630
(11.506) (11.950)
RWA/TA -0.217** -0.216+ -0.533***
(0.101) (0.129) (0.162)
Basel II SA * RWA/TA 0.228* 0.406*
(0.130) (0.213)
Basel II Advanced * RWA/TA -0.193 -0.076
(0.152) (0.176)
TCE/TA -0.369*** -0.020 -0.170
(0.122) (0.104) (0.351)
CustDeposits 0.268** 0.194*** 0.592***
(0.102) (0.062) (0.079)
Securities/Assets 0.094* 0.106** 0.039
(0.051) (0.051) (0.098)
NPL/Loans -0.301 -0.227 -0.199
(0.188) (0.161) (0.141)
ROAA 1.706** 2.625*** 2.592
(0.633) (0.256) (1.596)
log(Assets) -2.759*** -3.985*** -4.245***
(0.580) (0.483) (0.725)
Beta 0.020 0.141 0.693
(0.145) (0.121) (2.095)
Observations 767 767 304
Adj R-squared 0.249 0.314 0.423
The table presents regressions for banks in 32 countries. The dependent variable is
the bank’s stock return over the period from June 30, 2011 to September 30, 2011.
The independent variables include: an indicator variable representing countries
where banks predominantly use the Basel II Standardized Approach to calculating
RWA, an indicator variable for countries where banks predominantly use one of the
Basel II Advanced IRB approaches, and interactions between these indicators and
RWA/TA. The remaining independent variables are as in Table table:euroreg1and
each specification includes regional dummies (for North America, Europe, or Asia),
dummies representing bank business model, and dummy variables representing the
accounting method.
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4.8 Conclusion
There has been a steady decline in the measure of asset-risk that banks
report to regulators – risk-weighted assets (RWA) – over the last decade. In
light of this trend and other indications that banks may under-report RWA
in an attempt to minimize the amount of capital they must hold, we study
how equity market investors account for the riskiness of RWA by examining
the determinants of stock returns and a stock-market measure of risk of an
international panel of banks.
Regarding banking stock returns, we find a negative relationship between
RWA and stock returns over periods of financial crisis, suggesting that in-
vestors use RWA as an indicator of bank portfolio risk. Banks with higher
risk-weighted assets performed worse both during the subprime crisis and a
recent period of stock market decline accompanying the Eurozone sovereign
debt crisis. Comparing regions with different regulatory structures, we find
evidence that the relationship between stock returns and RWA is weaker
in countries where banks have more discretion in the calculation of RWA.
Specifically, in countries that had implemented Basel II before the onset of
the recent financial crisis, primarily following the standardized approach to
measuring credit risk, the relationship between stock returns and RWA is less
negative or even positive. In addition, we find a trade-off between capital
and funding in terms of their positive effects on bank stock returns. The
more stable a bank’s funding, the less positive the effect of capital on its
CHAPTER 4. BANKS’ RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS 103
stock return.
We also study a market measure of risk, the bank’s systematic risk, or
beta, from 2004 to 2010. We find no static relationship between RWA and
systematic risk across banks, however, we find evidence of a dynamic effect
where systematic risk increases for those banks whose RWA increases. Fi-
nally, there is evidence of a change in the relationship between systematic
risk and RWA since the start of the crisis. The positive relationship between
RWA and market risk in the three years prior to the crisis, from 2004 to 2006,
becomes negative, albeit small in magnitude, after the crisis.
In light of increasing risk-aversion in markets during times of crisis, the
question of how market assessments of risk should be incorporated into bank-
ing regulation and supervision remains. Indeed, the asymmetry of informa-
tion between banks, supervisors, and market participants regarding how risky
RWA are can lead to increased uncertainty about the adequacy of bank cap-
ital which, during a financial crisis, can have damaging effects for financial
stability.
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4.9 Appendix
Table 4.12: List of countries – full sample
Country # banks % Sample Country # banks % Sample
Australia 6 0.75 Norway 14 1.74
Austria 4 0.5 Philippines 11 1.37
Belgium 2 0.25 Poland 10 1.24
Canada 10 1.24 Russian Federation 8 1
China 11 1.37 Singapore 4 0.5
Denmark 11 1.37 Spain 8 1
Finland 2 0.25 Sri Lanka 5 0.62
France 4 0.5 Sweden 4 0.5
Germany 5 0.62 Switzerland 3 0.37
Greece 8 1 Taiwan 9 1.12
Hong Kong 6 0.75 Thailand 6 0.75
India 12 1.49 Turkey 10 1.24
Indonesia 8 1 Ukraine 2 0.25
Italy 20 2.49 UK 7 0.87
Japan 81 10.07 USA 500 62.19
Korea 4 0.5
Malaysia 9 1.12
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